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DISTURBANCES IN BANGALORE CITY, JULY 1928.

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REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY

APPOINTED BY THE

GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE

VOL. I—REPORT

BANGALORE:
PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS
1929

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BANGALORE DISTURBANCES ENQUIRY COMMITTEE

REPORT

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.—Terms of Reference.

On the 30th of July 1928 certain incidents and disorders occurred in Bangalore City in which school boys took a prominent part. They created disturbances over wide areas including the Public Offices, the Central Jail and the main entrance to the City. The adult population also joined the students in the course of the day and the disorders culminated in a serious riot between Hindus and Mussalmans towards nightfall. The riot was of very short duration and the disorders were quelled with the aid of the Military before midnight but a considerable amount of panic prevailed among the City population throughout that night and the following day. The news of the disturbances spread rapidly, and exaggerated and distorted versions of the various incidents gained currency throughout the State and even abroad. This was followed by reports of stray hostilities between Hindus and Mussalmans from various parts of the State, and a feeling of communal tension was created in a territory which, even in the worst days of Hindu-Moslem troubles in British India, had remained free from the contagion.

Efforts to restore harmony.

2. Government convened two conferences of Government Officers and leading citizens on the 3rd August and again on the 20th idem in order to allay public apprehension and restore good-will and harmony between the two communities. With the same object they also published accounts of the happenings, on the basis of

information collected by their own agencies, in the shape of Press Communiques issued from time to time. On the 31st July 1928 Government announced in a Press Communique that an independent enquiry by a Magistrate had been ordered into the disturbances of the previous day. This was followed by another Communique on the 3rd August in which the public were invited to give evidence of events within their knowledge before the Magistrate.

These efforts, however, did not have the desired effect. On account of the speeches made and the acrimonious discussions which followed, the first conference, far from being the means of generating peace and good-will, only served to harden suspicion and distrust. The attacks in the Press became more and more violent. As a result of all this, uneasiness in the public mind increased rather than diminished and public opinion declared itself in favour of an "authoritative public enquiry" by a properly constituted Committee.

Committee of Enquiry.

3. In conformity with their Press Communiques, dated the 6th August 1928, Government in their Order No. 1042-1102—C. B. 38-28-114, dated the 28th August 1928 (Appendix I), appointed a Committee constituted as follows:—

Chairman.

SIR M. VISVESVARAYA, K.C.I.E.

Members.

MR. JUSTICE D. K. RAMA RAO, B.A., B.L., *Judge, Chief Court of Mysore.*

MR. H. G. BASAVAPPA, *Member, Legislative Council.*

MR. GULAM AHMED KALAMI.

MR. V. MANICKAVELU MUDALIAR.

MR. B. NAGAPPA, Bar-at-Law, *Legal Remembrancer and Secretary to Government, Law Department.*

MR. RALPH NYE, *Member, Legislative Council.*

The terms of reference to the Committee are :—

(i) To ascertain the root causes and course of events that led to the disturbances ;

(ii) To investigate the special causes or influences, if any, which were at work at the time and which led to such unusual events ;

(iii) To examine the steps taken by the local officers to cope with the situation ; and

(iv) To suggest any future measures necessary to remove misunderstandings and restore good feeling and harmony among the various communities concerned.

Proceedings of the Committee.

4. The Committee held its first meeting on the 4th September 1928 with a view to settle the preliminaries and the procedure to be adopted during the enquiry. The regular enquiry began from the 12th September 1928 in the Daly Memorial Hall, this building having been made available for the use of the Committee through the courtesy of the authorities of the Mythic Society. With the exception of an interval of eleven days during the Dasara Holidays, the Committee held their sittings regularly from week to week till the 12th November on which date the sittings came to an end.

The total number of sittings was 30, and the number of witnesses examined was 156, of whom 125 were examined in public, 8 *in camera* and 23 partly in public and partly *in camera*.

Written statements or brief memoranda were invited from the majority of the witnesses, prior to their appearance before the Committee, to obtain an idea of the trend of their evidence. These statements were not accepted as evidence, although in special cases portions of them were admitted at the discretion of the Committee during the oral examination of the witnesses.

In order to give the various communities or interests concerned an opportunity to represent their case to their own satisfaction, a counsel or representative for each of the following interests was permitted to watch such interests in the course of the examination of witnesses :—

(i) The Hindu Community,
(ii) The Muslim Community,
(iii) The Students,
(iv) The Press.

The gentlemen who assisted in this capacity were Messrs. S. Venkatapathaiya, Mirle N. Lakshminaranappa, A. J. Khaleel, K. Shamanna and V. S. Sanjeeva Rao. Representatives of the Government Departments also attended some of the sittings.

In order to elicit further information desired on behalf of the communities or interests concerned, the counsel or representatives were permitted towards the conclusion of the examination of each witness by the Members of the Committee, to hand in lists of questions to be put to the witness at the discretion of the Chairman. The same representatives were also invited at the close of the public sittings to place before the Committee, orally and *in camera*, summaries of the arguments which they desired to press on the attention of the Committee.

5. Government directed all official witnesses to give full and correct information within their knowledge concerning the disturbances, and they also gave an assurance that the witnesses would not come under the displeasure of Government for giving evidence in such manner, and that any evidence of a self-incriminating nature given *in camera* by any person would not be made use of against him by the Government.

The records of the Additional District Magistrate were placed at the disposal of the Committee and the information obtained was used in the course of the selection and examination of witnesses.

Design of Report.

6. The design of the report is arranged with an eye to meet the complexities of the case. Chapter I is introductory and Chapters II and III give a plain narrative of events, stripped of all controversial matter. Chapters IV and V which give, what for convenience may be termed the versions of the Hindu and Muslim communities respectively, are not to be taken as representing the views held by the Committee. The remaining seven chapters give the opinions and findings of the Committee on the various issues which came up for consideration in the course of the enquiry.

7. We are indebted to Government for giving us every help and facility needed for conducting the enquiry. Our thanks are due to the gentlemen, both official and non-official, who came forward to give evidence, and also to the counsel or representatives mentioned above who assisted us in the enquiry at some personal sacrifice.

Acknowledgments.

We desire to place on record our appreciation of the valuable services rendered by the Secretary, Mr. C. E. Noronha, and the Special Officers, Messrs. T. Abdul Khadir and C. K. Venkataramaiya. The office staff also worked to our entire satisfaction.

CHAPTER II.

Narrative of Events up to 29th July inclusive.

8. The Government Order appointing this Committee lays emphasis on the events of the 30th and 31st July 1928 and the disorders leading thereto. As a matter of fact, the effects of the disturbances were in evidence till the end of August 1928, and no account of the same would be complete without a reference to the events immediately preceding the 30th July, and also to some that transpired subsequent to the 31st July 1928. We, therefore, propose to begin this chapter with an account of the actual undisputed occurrences up to the 29th July inclusive. The 30th July happens to be the most eventful day associated with the disturbances and we shall deal with the incidents of that day and other cognate events subsequent to the same in the next chapter.

How Ganesha image came into prominence.

9. It appears that more than twenty years ago an image of Ganesha existed in the central hall of the building of the present school, then known as the City Municipal School. In course of time, the institution was remodelled and came to be known as the "S. R. Nanjundaiah's Hindu A. V. School." For some time—the exact interval is not known—the building was used as an Octroi godown. In 1921, the then Head Master of the School, Mr. H. P. Krishna Rao, conceived the idea of training the students in practical gardening and developing their aesthetic instincts. He converted the bare and parched ground in the school compound into a pleasant garden. A number of small plots were laid out in which the boys grew flower and ornamental plants, and in each plot was fixed as a sort of tutelary deity one of the stone images of Hindu gods which they found scattered over the premises. In the central plot in the compound, which was the largest, an image of Ganesha or "the God of wisdom and Remover of obstacles," probably the present image, was installed on a masonry plinth or pedestal, and a *badami* or country almond tree planted just behind it to serve as a back-ground. Mr. Krishna Rao states that the

erection of a niche over the idol was also then contemplated, but not carried out.

The students of the school seem to have developed a special attachment to this particular image, and whereas the smaller garden plots gradually disappeared, and with their disappearance the other images came to be neglected, Ganesha continued to receive attention. The deity was appealed to for success, especially in the students' examinations. It is stated that at the close of an examination, the boys used to empty their ink bottles on the head of the image in order to propitiate the deity.

Construction of a niche for the image.

10. Recently, the plinth or pedestal referred to above having fallen into disrepair and the image having got displaced from its erect posture, the boys took the opportunity of the annual repairs to the school building to prevail upon the contractor, one Mr. N. Nanjundaiah, to oblige them by repairing the pedestal and also building over it a small arched niche for the better protection of the image. The contractor complied with their request and the niche seems to have been built between the 2nd and 5th June 1928. The cost which was small, about Rs. 6 or 7, was met by the contractor himself out of piety or merely to oblige the boys ; it was not separately charged for in his bill for the repairs.

The previous permission of the authorities was not obtained for this new construction ; the contractor seems to have thought that there could be no objection since a pedestal was already there. The structure was erected when the Head Master was on casual leave and he saw it as completed for the first time on his return from leave on the 5th of June. Some days before that, however, *i.e.* about the 29th May, the idol had been removed by the boys with his concurrence to the Scout Room of the school.

Action by the Director of Public Instruction.

11. Mr. N. S. Subba Rao, the Director of Public Instruction, received a D. O. letter under date the 12th June 1928 from the Private Secretary to the Dewan, stating that the Dewan understood that a small temple, likely to develop into a big one, was being erected in the compound of the school, and requesting him to look into the matter and find out what could be done to stop its

construction, as it was apprehended that with a mosque in close proximity the construction of such a structure was undesirable as it might lead to communal friction. The Director, accordingly, paid a surprise visit to the institution arriving there at about 10-15 A.M. on the 15th June and after a general inspection of the premises examined the niche and made enquiries about it. He was informed of all the particulars by the Head Master, who further told him that the boys intended providing another step to the pedestal, a door of expanded metal to the opening of the niche and a stone slab in front for breaking cocoanuts at times of worship. The Director thought that if the image were brought back to the niche it would be difficult to see it removed in the future and he therefore felt that no steps should be taken which could not be retraced without difficulty. It seemed to him desirable to collect the necessary information and consult the Government regarding the desirability or otherwise of allowing anything like a permanent institution for denominational worship within the precincts of a Government building in which a public school was held for the benefit of all communities. He called for a report from the Head-Master of the history of the image which he noticed lay in the compound unconsecrated, and orally instructed the Head Master not to permit further developments or allow the image to be restored to its old place till he heard from him again. The Head Master accordingly issued a memorandum that very day requesting the assistant masters of his school to explain the situation to the boys and ask them to suspend further arrangements.

On the same day, the Director replied to the Private Secretary to the Dewan explaining the above circumstances and stating that, as the compound of the school was used as a passage by the boys of the Urdu school which is situated just behind the A. V. School, he was of opinion that it was undesirable to restore the image itself to its old place in the school compound. He added that he had not only ordered the suspension of further action in respect of Ganesha but had also instructed that a number of other idols lying about the place should be removed and placed inside the building. He promised to enquire further into the whole matter and to take suitable action to make sure that on the one hand "no attempt is made at any worship in the compound area, and on the other that the

susceptibilities of the boys who seem to have taken much interest in the matter are not hurt."

On the morning of the 21st June, the Director of Public Instruction had to make certain inspections in the same locality in company with Mr. Abbas Khan, the then President of the Bangalore City Municipal Council, and other Municipal Officers. According to the Director, Mr. Abbas Khan on that occasion took the Overseer attached to the Education Department to task for having permitted the construction of the niche without authority.

First signs of discontent.

12. For about a fortnight after the order of the Director of Public Instruction, no complaint of any kind was made to the school authorities either by the boys themselves or by those interested in them nor were any signs of discontent observed. Meanwhile, a report got abroad in the City that the Ganesha image in the school had been kept away from its old seat at the instance of Mr. Abbas Khan. As that gentleman's house is situated just opposite the school and there is a *musjid* behind it, it was thought that he was responsible for the interference through personal and communal motives. A Kannada daily newspaper, *Veerakesari*, first gave expression to this rumour in its issue of the 27th June 1928, but contradicted the same the next day after Mr. Abbas Khan had sought an interview with the editor and disclaimed that he had any objection to the image. The question was also taken up by *Prajamitra*, *Navajeevana* and the *Mysore Star* and was commented upon on the Balepet Propaganda Board.

Then individual efforts followed to see the image restored. Mr. T. T. Sharma, editor of the Kannada newspaper *Visvakarnataka* wrote to the Director of Public Instruction in the matter on the 29th June, and having been referred by him to the Publicity Officer to Government communicated with the Chief Secretary to Government on the 3rd July 1928 but received no reply. A representative of *Veerakesari* also called on the Director of Public Instruction on the 27th June to enquire into the matter, but not being satisfied with the meagre information supplied, published with comments a report of his interview with the Director of Public Instruction in the issue of that paper of 28th June. The matter was

also referred to in the issue of the *Prajamitra* of the 27th June. On the 24th July, when he was in Pavagada, the Director of Public Instruction received a communication from the Development Secretary to Government enclosing a copy of the letter dated 3rd July from the editor of *Visvakarnataka* and asking for a statement of facts on the case. The statement was supplied by the Director from Sira on the 27th July.

Agitation by students and their leaders.

13. **23rd July**.—An organized agitation came to notice on the 23rd July, that is, more than five weeks after the order of the Director of Public Instruction referred to above. On the evening of that date, it was noticed that Mr. H. V. Subrahmanyam of Malleswaram had joined the agitation and came to lead the boys. The boys then insisted on the Head Master restoring the Ganesha image to the niche which had been newly constructed.

14. **24th July**.—On this date at about 10-50 A.M. on approaching his school to begin the day's work, the Head Master found a crowd of boys, both of his own and of other schools, led by the same Mr. Subrahmanyam, making a noisy demonstration on the road in front of the school and attempting to coerce other boys to join them. On enquiry he was informed that they would not enter their classes until the image was restored. His advice being unheeded and fearing a breach of the peace, the Head Master went to the New Market police station and reported the occurrence to the Police Inspector. The Inspector proceeded to the school and after posting a few constables there to prevent further disorders went on the track of the strikers, who in the meantime had left towards Chickpet parading the streets led by Mr. Subrahmanyam. He found about a hundred of them on the road leading to the Balepet square. At about 1-15 P.M. the same day he saw near the Mysore Bank a few boys under the same leader, shouting and marching in the direction of the District Office. The Assistant Superintendent of Police, who is the head of the police force in the City, was then communicated with and thereafter at about 5 P.M. a Sub-Inspector of Police was instructed by him to watch the movement of the strikers from the morning of the 25th onwards. On the 24th, only 49 students out of a total strength of 344 attended the school.

15. **25th July.**—On the 25th July also at about 10-30 A.M. a small crowd of boys collected outside the school, the number of those attending the classes being only 97. The strikers, who consisted chiefly of boys of about 11 to 14 years of age, made a demonstration in front of the school under the direction of Messrs. Subrahmanyam and Ramlal Thivari. They obstructed the traffic on the road and attempted to coerce other boys to join them. A warning given by the police to Mr. Subrahmanyam went unheeded and after a short while he and his colleague led the noisy demonstrators to the Mamoolpet School, a branch of Sultanpet Middle School, where after creating a disturbance and pelting stones, they induced some of the students to join them. From there they proceeded *via* Chickpet and Balepet to the Arya Vidya Patasala in Hospital lane to repeat the same procedure; but the Head Master of this institution firmly resisted their attempts, whereupon Mr. Subrahmanyam after an altercation with him, led away his mob of followers to the Municipal Garden near the Dharmambudhi tank. Here both he and Mr. Thivari lectured to the boys for about half an hour, advising them on no account to enter their classes till the Ganesha image was restored.

The lectures over, the boys were led through Akkipet and Aralepet to Chamarajpet Middle School which they reached at about 12-30 P.M. After about a quarter of an hour's demonstration there, they proceeded to the Fort A. V. School at about 1 P.M. They informed the Head Master of this school that they had gone there to obtain the sympathetic support of the students in the matter of the restoration of the Ganesha idol. On the Head Master informing them that that was no concern of his boys, the strikers hooted and threw stones into the class rooms. The Head Master thought it wise to dismiss his classes and made a report of the occurrence to the Assistant Superintendent of Police.

Mr. Subrahmanyam then collected all his followers under a tree on the Police parade ground, opposite the Fort A. V. School, at about 1-15 P.M. and explaining to them the origin of the Ganesha image and how it was an insult to the Hindu religion that it should have been removed, advised them under no circumstances to go back to their schools till it was restored. After this he dispersed

the strikers, asking them to meet him again in the evening at the Municipal Garden. The same evening at about 6-30 P.M. the three leaders, Messrs. Subrahmanyam, Ramlal Thivari and J. Bhima Rao, held a meeting opposite the New Market buildings in the City attended by 200 to 300 students, and lectured to them.

16. **26th July.**—The strike continued on the 26th, the number of boys attending the Sultanpet school having fallen to 58. As on the previous day, the strikers led by Mr. Subrahmanyam collected near the school at the time of the opening of the classes, and by moral or physical pressure induced many other boys to join them. They then, as before, proceeded to the Mamoolpet School and the Arya Vidya Patasala, and having swelled their ranks by drawing in the boys of those institutions, gathered at the Municipal Garden where Mr. Subrahmanyam again lectured to them. A move was thence made to Malleswaram where Mr. Subrahmanyam delivered another speech on the *maidan* near the Reading Room. The Police Inspector who cautioned them not to obstruct traffic on the road was defied by Mr. Subrahmanyam and hit by a stone. The mob then, at about 1-15 P.M., under the guidance of Messrs. Subrahmanyam and Thivari and armed with sticks and stones, rushed into the compound of the Malleswaram Middle School hooting and shouting. They damaged some of the windows, and insisted on the Head Master dismissing the classes to enable the boys to join the strike. The Head Master while trying to reason with them was hit on the leg with a stone. The mob then left the place at about 1-30 P.M. when the classes were let off for the interval, but only to repeat their tactics at the High and the Primary schools in the same locality. After this they again proceeded to the Municipal Garden to hold another meeting. At about 5 P.M. they returned to the Sultanpet school where having placed a picture of Ganapathi in the empty niche and offered prayers they dispersed.

17. **27th July.**—On the 27th July only 41 boys attended the Sultanpet school. The strikers led by Mr. Subrahmanyam paraded the streets with a picture of Ganesha fixed to a pole till the afternoon. At about 4-30 P.M. the agitation assumed a new turn, the strikers beginning what they called *Satyagraha* or passive resistance. They stopped

Satyagraha begun.

their street marching and, as the school gate was closed, began to squat in batches of six on the road in front of the Sultanpet school performing *Bhajana*, that is, reciting religious songs. A huge crowd collected round them and traffic was obstructed. Mr. Subrahmanyam though warned by the police assumed a defiant attitude and made speeches likely to offend the Mussalmans. The same evening the Deputy Commissioner issued orders to initiate proceedings to bind over the three leaders to keep the peace. The *Satyagraha* was continued the whole night, the boys who observed it being fed on the spot by their sympathisers.

Satyagraha continued.

18. **28th July.**—On the 28th July only 8 boys attended the Sultanpet school. *Satyagraha* was continued and the whole street from Gundopanth Street crossing up to the Mysore Road was blocked by large crowds. It is stated that the Deputy Commissioner while coming to the spot in the morning was obstructed at the Nalbandwadi square and that he went back. Two *gosha* carts going to the Urdu Girls' school, which is situated next door to Mr. Abbas Khan's house, were obstructed. This irritated the Mussalmans who were present there, but by the timely intervention of the police nothing untoward happened. A complaint was made to the Assistant Superintendent of Police. Strenuous efforts were also made that day by some prominent citizens to induce the leaders to call off the strike, assuring them that they would see to the early restoration of the idol. As an earnest of their assurance, they even obtained a written undertaking from all the Municipal Councillors, including the President, Mr. Mahomed Abbas Khan, promising to see the image restored within ten days. But while two of the leaders, namely, Messrs. Ramlal Thivari and Bhima Rao, were agreeable, Mr. Subrahmanyam was adamant. He told the boys that he was to be arrested and that on no account they should give up *Satyagraha* till the image was actually restored. In spite of heavy rain which began to pour in the evening, the *Satyagrahis* continued to squat outside, and at about 6 P.M. they took up their position near the room where the image was kept.

19. **29th July.**—On the morning of the 29th July, two of the leaders, Messrs. Subrahmanyam and Bhima Rao, were arrested in the course of proceedings taken under

Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Satyagraha*, however, continued and a large crowd collected in the compound of the Sultanpet school where Mr. T. T. Sharma, editor of *Visvakarnataka*, discoursed on the Ganesha incident and explained to them the attempts made by him and others to prevent the situation growing serious. Mr. Shankaranarayana Rao approached the Dewan about the restoration of the image and the Dewan, who, it may be mentioned, was absent from Bangalore between the 18th and 26th July, was willing to go to the spot himself but on noticing Mr. Matthan, Member in charge of the Education portfolio, come in, asked him to visit the school instead and do the needful. Mr. Matthan arrived at the school at about midday when he found Mr. Sharma addressing the crowd. At the earnest representation of the people present, Mr. Matthan before leaving promised to order the immediate restoration of the image.

Restoration of image.

20. On the afternoon of the 29th July, one Mr. Sarvabhatta, a resident of Anekal Taluk, who was a believer in passive resistance, took the place of the arrested leaders and helped the boys to continue the *Satyagraha*. A crowd of students and others also attempted to rush the office of the Assistant Superintendent of Police, under the impression that the arrested leaders were lodged there, but on being assured that they had been taken to the Central Jail they dispersed. At about 3 P.M., Mr. Sudarsaniengar, Personal Assistant to the Director of Public Instruction, came to the Sultanpet school and restored the image to its old place on the pedestal over which the new niche had been built. *Satyagraha* was, however, continued as the students had another grievance by this time owing to the arrest of the leaders. The boys who practised this *Satyagraha* and did not go to their homes were fed by sympathisers as on previous days.

Leaders in Jail.

21. At about 2 P.M., Messrs. Subrahmanyam and Bhima Rao were lodged in the Central Jail and Mr. Ramlal Thivari who was arrested later was brought there at about 6-30 P.M. In order to allay public feeling and stop further agitation, strenuous efforts were made by several citizens to induce the prisoners to obtain their release either by furnishing sureties or tendering an apology as suggested

by Government. At length, after much persuasion they agreed and signed a form of apology, but the same did not meet with the approval of the officers of Government concerned.

That same night at about 8-30 P.M., some 250 boys, including even seven year old children, came in procession with Kitson lights to the Jail carrying a picture of Ganesha. They were accompained by a few adult persons. They insisted on seeing the prisoners and demanded their release. The Superintendent, Mr. K. Siddaramappa, telephoned to the Police for help and in the meanwhile kept humouring the demonstrators by addressing and trying to reason with them. The boys, however, on being assured that some of them would be permitted to interview the prisoners the next morning, left the place.

CHAPTER III.

Narrative of Events continued—Rioting on 30th July and incidents that followed.

Satyagraha continued.

22. The events of 30th July are all important and the scenes of the occurrences on that date are indicated on the City map (Appendix x). That was a working day for all the schools. Normally the classes should have opened at 11 A.M. The boys of the Sultanpet Middle School under the supervision of Mr. Sarvabhatta continued *Satyagraha*, as on the previous day, with six boys at a time sitting in front of the niche of the Ganesha in the school compound. To some extent Mr. Sarvabhatta was assisted in his self-imposed duties by Mr. T. T. Sharma, editor of *Visvakarnataka*. Mr. Sarvabhatta contemplated seeking a new place outside the school for discussing all other business connected with the agitation leaving only a few boys at the niche to keep *Satyagraha* going.

The Students' Strike.

23. Although no overt acts of actual disturbance, such as stone-throwing or obstruction in the streets, had occurred that morning, yet there were premonitions that the situation might develop more seriously. Hand-bills in large numbers were being circulated calling upon the boys of all schools to go on strike. According to Mr. Vajapeyam Venkatesaiya two or three students cycled all the way from Mysore and reported that many more boy sympathisers would arrive in the course of the day. A poster had been fixed to the compound wall announcing a meeting on the Gandhi Maidan in the evening. At the same time there was an attempt in the direction of a peaceful settlement. Mr. K. Shankaranarayana Rao continued his efforts of the previous day to this end, met the Deputy Commissioner and the Inspector-General of Police and discussed with these officers the draft of an apology which he placed before them; but as the draft did not contain an expression of regret for past acts by the three strike leaders, it was not accepted.

24. The tranquility of the City received the first rude shock when the strikers of the Sultanpet School went to the Fort High School at 11 A.M., caused disturbances and called upon the boys to strike work. The boys of this school struck work and several of them joined the strikers. On requisition by the Head Master of the Fort High School, the Assistant Superintendent of Police went there and persuaded the boys to disperse. Within a short time reports were received by the Assistant Superintendent of Police of similar outbreaks at the London Mission High School and the Wesleyan Mission High School, both of which institutions had to be closed by the authorities concerned in order to prevent further mischief. The strikers, including some grown-up boys, also visited the Central College at about noon and in spite of every effort on the part of the principal and professors, the normal work of the College could not be proceeded with. The crowd remained at the College till 1-30 P.M. The Assistant Superintendent of Police and the Police Inspectors under him visited all the above schools and dispersed the crowds. The Assistant Superintendent of Police then went to his office in the Fort to collect information from all the centres of disturbance and to muster the Reserve Police Force as the situation was rapidly assuming serious proportions. The strikers, having succeeded in getting the colleges and schools closed, next turned their attention to the Central Jail where their leaders had been incarcerated.

25. The strikers arrived at the Central Jail at 12-15 P.M., 500 to 600 strong, including a few older boys of 18 to 20 years of age, some of whom were holding small branches of trees in their hands. They threw stones some of which struck the main gate of the Jail, the window shutters of the Chief Jailor's quarters situated over the main gate, and several other parts of the Jail buildings. They also uprooted some garden plants. The evidence of the Superintendent shows that repeated attempts were made by the boys from all directions to force open the gates, and their rowdyism could not be checked until the armed guard turned out and the Superintendent gave the boys to understand that he had powers to open fire. Injuries were caused to six warders by stone-throwing. The Superintendent told the boys that he had no power to release the leaders unless he received orders

At the Central Jail.

from the District Magistrate or the City Magistrate. This eased the situation at the Jail for the time being and some of the students dispersed, but a large body of them moved in the direction of Carlton House, the residence of the Dewan, at 12-40 P.M.

At the Dewan's quarters. The Military requisitioned.

26. The Superintendent of the Central Jail observing the move sent half a dozen warders there and himself followed on his bi-cycle. He saw the Dewan, his son and his brother-in-law surrounded in the portico by boys mostly between the ages of 12 and 14, although there were some also of 18 years or more. As he saw that the boys were rowdy and that some of them were even getting up the steps to reach the door, he telephoned for police help. Some boys caused damage to plants and windows, others who had got on to the steps hooted from there, while one boy was rattling a box on which "Ganapathi *Satyagraha*" was written and demanding contributions. At that time, the Third Member of Council, the Chief Secretary, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Superintendent of Police and the Inspector-General of Police all arrived. The District Magistrate, after observing the state of affairs, telephoned to the Chief Commandant, Mysore State Troops, for military aid. The District Superintendent of Police arrived a little later at 2 P.M. The persuasions of the Dewan were only met with persistent demands from the boys for immediate orders for release of their leaders. The boys were not peaceful in spite of appeals from the Deputy Commissioner and other officers. The Dewan was anxious that there should be no arrests at his house. Finally, when he left Carlton House for the Public Offices, some boys lay down in front of the car and had to be lifted out of the way. Some persons in the crowd threw stones at the car and broke the glass panes when it stopped for a few seconds while the compound gate, which the boys had closed, was being opened. The Deputy Commissioner states that the number of boys in the compound was about a thousand and that even after the Dewan's car left the boys would not disperse. They said that they would not go until orders were given for the release of their leaders. According to the Inspector-General of Police, even after the extra Reserve Police turned up it was not possible to disperse the boys peacefully, and it was considered necessary to employ

the *sowars* for that purpose. By keeping the horses moving, the *sowars* succeeded in dispersing the crowd from the compound. It is stated that with the exception of one boy who fell accidently and was injured no one in the crowd was hurt.

Second visit to Jail.

27. Some of the boys ejected from the Dewan's quarters proceeded to the Central Jail at 2-30 P.M., their second visit, and as the situation there was reported to be serious, the District Magistrate instructed Lieut. Mir Turab Ali, who was in charge of the Mysore Lancers, to send *sowars* to guard approaches to the Jail and prevent crowds collecting. Accordingly, three troops of Lancers took up positions, one at the Yelahanka Gate Square, another at Kantaraj Urs Circle and a third at the Hindu Hostels on the Railway Station Road. The *sowars* were moving up and down from those places, some up to Sri Krishnarajendra Circle. In this second visit also the boys threw stones and committed other acts of rowdyism. Among those hit were the Inspector-General of Prisons, the Jail Superintendent and one of his friends. Although the Inspector-General of Prisons interviewed and requested the imprisoned leaders to write to the boys outside to desist from committing excesses, the leaders refused. In all 11 members of the Jail staff including two superior officers were injured. At 5 P.M., the crowd near the Jail numbered 3,000 to 4,000 and it included some adults also.

At the Public Offices.

28. In the meanwhile, other boys had begun to gather at the Public Offices from about 2 P.M. Those who were dispersed from the Dewan's quarters and followed his car swelled the number. They stood in groups in the central portico and some sat on the lawns. As they would not disperse in spite of exhortations and seemed to be inclined to mischief, a detachment of six Lancers was brought by the Assistant Superintendent of Police in person from the Dewan's quarters. In the act of dispersing the boys, injuries were inflicted on both sides. The police and military forces being found inadequate, a requisition was made for further military aid, and Lt. Col. Landon sent a second squadron of 110 Lancers. It was at first difficult to disperse the crowd of boys as they were in scattered groups all over the place—on the lawns, under

trees and on the roads—and ran backwards and forwards helping themselves to stones from the heaps of road metal stacked there and pelting at the Lancers. The movements of the *sowars* and the stone-throwing by the boys resulted in injuries to both *sowars* and boys. One boy (Mylariah) fell in the way of a *sowar*, was trampled by the horse and received serious injury to his leg which had subsequently to be amputated. Later in the day, to meet possible contingencies, a third squadron of about 80 Lancers was obtained but it was not used. An Infantry force of 61 men and 4 officers was also called in to guard the Public Offices.

At the Yelahanka Gate, Kantharaj Urs Circle, and near the Jail.

29. The Lancers who were sent at 3 P.M. to the Yelahanka Gate, as well as those who were previously engaged in breaking up crowds in the District Office compound and on the Avenue Road, soon got into conflict with the mobs. This led to mutual reprisals. Just as the situation was about to assume serious proportions, a police officer telephoned to Mr. K. Shankaranarayana Rao, the Chief Scout Commissioner, who was popular with the boys, to go over to the place to pacify the students. The Dewan sent the Deputy Commissioner also to the scene with Mr. K. Shankaranarayana Rao. At this time, the crowd consisted of boys as well as many adults. The Deputy Commissioner, acting upon the suggestions of Mr. B. K. Garudachar and some non-official gentlemen, withdrew the *sowars*. The crowd temporarily became calm but soon renewed activities. The *sowars* while withdrawing towards the Jail were freely pelted with stones and several of them received serious injuries. Again, between the crowd in the vicinity of Kantharaj Urs Circle and the Military stationed at that place there were serious reprisals. Some of the Lancers entered the compound of the Meteorological Observatory to disperse the crowd. In one of their rushes, they unwittingly chased Mr. K. Shankaranarayana Rao and angrily pointed their lances at him. The evidence of Mr. K. Shankaranarayana Rao and Dr. E. P. Metcalfe, the Principal of the Central College, who lives close by, shows that there was a regular rain of stones on the *sowars* at this juncture (4-45 P.M.). The crowd being very large at the Kantharaj Urs Circle, the Military Officer in command frequently applied for help and received further reinforcements.

But the situation did not improve until 5-30 P.M., when Major Krishna Urs visited the circle and at the suggestion of certain persons asked the Military to withdraw to some distance towards Carlton House.

Release of strike leaders.

30. While the Military and the crowds were thus engaged at the several places mentioned above, some leading public men, including lawyers, interviewed the Dewan and other Government officers and requested them to give heed to the representation of the boys and release the leaders. The Dewan agreed to see six representatives of the boys and spoke to them, and eventually the Government agreed to the release of the leaders on their entering into personal recognizances before the City Magistrate. The arrested leaders were prevailed upon to agree to this condition in the interests of the boys and they were accordingly released at 6-30 P.M., by the City Magistrate. The prominent public men who helped to obtain the release got a promise from the arrested leaders and the boys present at the Jail gate that they would go home quietly after meeting at Dharmambudi Tank and that they would on no account go to the Sultanpet Middle School.

Visit of Mussalmans to the Dewan's quarters.

31. After being informed that the leaders had been released, the Deputy Commissioner visited Carlton House to take the District Superintendent of Police with him to the office of the Assistant Superintendent of Police to draw up a programme for the requisite night patrol. He observed that a crowd of Mussalmans from the City and the Civil and Military Station, variously estimated at between 50 and 300, had come to Carlton House to make enquiries after the Dewan. On being assured that the Dewan was not injured, they left the place.

Procession of released leaders.

32. The promise of the leaders and the boys to go home quietly after meeting at the Dharmambudi Tank was not kept. Messrs. Subrahmanyam and Thivari, two of the released leaders, were carried on men's shoulders in a procession *via* Dodpet and Market Square to the Sultanpet School which they reached at about 7 P.M. On their way they intended to visit the boys injured during the day who

were in the Victoria Hospital, but were persuaded not to go there as the patients would be disturbed. Mr. J. Bhima Rao, the third released leader, who was slightly unwell, went in Dr. Gopalakrishna Rao's car with Mr. Belur Srinivasa Iyengar, an advocate, towards Dharmambudi Tank where it was intended to hold a meeting. But finding no one there they also went *via* Balepet to the Sultanpet Middle School. On the way, Mr. Belur Srinivasa Iyengar delivered short speeches at five places. This procession also reached the school a few minutes after the other two leaders had arrived. On reaching the school, Mr. Belur Srinivasa Iyengar made a speech standing in his car. As the accounts of this speech vary, we prefer to deal with it in its proper place in Chapters IV and V.

The Riot.

33. At this time some Mussalmans had collected on the upper and lower verandahs of the cycle shop, which is situated to the south of the school at the junction of the Arcot Srinivasa Char street and the Police Road. The highest Police official on duty at the school when the procession arrived was Mr. B. Seshadri Iyer, Sub-Inspector of Police, who was moving about in the compound of the school and regulating the crowd. He had under his orders Sergeant Venkatesaiah, Constables Narasimhiah and Mariappa, who were posted for duty at the gate, and two other police constables who were somewhere near the Nalbundwadi Square. It may be mentioned here that the full complement of policemen detailed for shift duty at the school was not working when the procession arrived. Six of them had been withdrawn in the afternoon for other duty. There were left only 4 constables for duty under one sub-inspector and one sergeant to maintain order in a crowd which was estimated at 3,000 to 5,000. After they arrived at the school, the leaders went into the compound for *Mangalarathi* (worship) which was finished in about five minutes and then they left. Very soon afterwards disorder ensued which soon developed into a serious riot. The different versions of this riot are given in Chapters IV and V. In the course of this riot, 74 Hindus and 2 Mussalmans were among the injured and taken to the Victoria Hospital.

34. During the fight, some people ran to the office of the Assistant Superintendent of Police and the Market

Police Station to report and obtain assistance. The Inspector-General of Police, the Deputy Commissioner, the District Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, who were engaged in the office of the Assistant Superintendent of Police in the Fort working out plans for the night, being informed that there was a fight and firing, immediately left for the scene of occurrence with Major B. P. Krishne Urs. The District Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police arrived on the scene first and this was at about 8 P.M. They found a crowd of 200 to 300 Mussalmans at the southern end of Arcot Srinivasa Char Street and a very large crowd of Hindus at the northern end of the same street. The Mussalmans were found armed with *lathis*. The Hindu crowd was pelting stones at the corrugated iron doors of a stable in the direction of the mosque, apparently to frighten the Mussalmans in that neighbourhood. The District Superintendent of Police says that the Mussalmans who had gathered at the Nalbundwadi Square made enquiries whether the Dewan was injured and that he assured them he was not. While the District Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police were still engaged in persuading the crowds at the two spots on either side of Mr. Abbas Khan's house to disperse, the Deputy Commissioner and the Inspector-General of Police arrived on the scene. In the meantime, information of the disturbance was carried to Carlton House by Dharmaprakasa Chandre Gowda and as a result a detachment of Lancers sent from there also arrived. At the sight of the Military the armed mobs melted away. A little later (at 8-30 P.M.), a posse of the Special Reserve Police also arrived. The *sowars* were picketed at all the principal junctions of Arcot Srinivasa Char Street and some constables were posted for duty in the compound of the school.

Armed bands of men in other parts of the City.

35. Quiet was soon restored at the scene of the riot, but some Hindus and Mussalmans snatched pieces of wood and sticks from the fuel shops in the vicinity and perambulated the streets in Cottonpet to the west of the School and other streets and lanes. Rumours of attacks on houses and molestation of women prevailed in the City and helped to create a panic both on the 31st July and the next few days.

36. The news of this riot having reached the Civil and Military Station brought three bands of Mussalmans into the City. One batch reached Sultanpet at about 11 P.M. and made enquiries of Lieut. Basavaraj Urs about the safety of the Nalbundwadi mosque. They were taken to the Mosque under the escort of the military and then led to the Market Square where they were dispersed. A rumour that a batch of Mussalmans from the Civil and Military Station was moving in Cottonpet having reached him, the Assistant Superintendent of Police patrolled that area but when he actually went there he found none. About midnight the Assistant Superintendent of Police received a message from the Ulsoor Gate Police Station that 300 to 500 Mussalmans armed with *lathis* were coming from the Civil and Military Station and he met them near the Usmania Theatre. On being satisfied that Mr. Abbas Khan was safe and that no damage was done to the Muslim tomb in the Market Square they dispersed. These bands of Civil and Military Station Mussalmans marching in the streets of the City struck terror into the hearts of the inhabitants.

Mussalmans from Civil and Military Station.

37. In the meanwhile, Mr. Abbas Khan, on the advice of a Lancer officer, left his house at about 11-30 P.M. with the members of his family in a motor car with *gosha* curtains on the sides. The car made two trips to the Lancers' Lines in Hebbal where a relative of his lived.

Mr. Abbas Khan leaves home.

38. The incidents of the previous day had roused hostile feelings in the minds of both the communities and there was a general panic in the City on the 31st July. The shops in the City were closed for fear that they may be looted and the people were in constant dread. Rumours also spread that the labourers of the Binny Mills had struck work and would demolish the grave in the City Market Square, and there was also a talk that there would be a fight between Hindus and Mussalmans. The Deputy Commissioner went to the Mills and ascertained that the labourers did not attend to their work as usual, not because they had any grievances or a desire to commit acts of violence, but to protect their houses. Appeals for special protection were made to the Inspector-General of

Panic in the City on 31st July.

Police by the Grain Merchants' Association, the Bank of Mysore, the Postmaster and others. The Government in the circumstances obtained the use of armoured cars from the British force in the Civil and Military Station, and arranged for a thorough patrol of the streets by them as well as by the Mysore Lancers under the control of the Magistrates. This, with the co-operation of the civil authorities of the Civil and Military Station, who prevented the Mussalmans from entering the City, had the desired effect, and the crowds which were collected here and there dispersed though stray assaults were reported from isolated parts.

Stray incidents of hostility in the City and the State.

39. The street patrols continued on the 1st August also but were thereafter discontinued as panic had ceased and public confidence had to a large extent been restored. After this, stray incidents of hostility of a communal nature were reported both from the Bangalore City and other parts of the State, details of which will be found in Appendix viii.

CHAPTER IV.

The Version of the Hindu Community and Students.*

40. In this chapter we propose to explain the position taken up by the Hindus and the students, that is, *their* case as put forward by the Hindu witnesses themselves, reserving the Mussalman version for the next chapter. We do not imply that the case for the Hindus, as put forward in this chapter, is subscribed to by all the Hindu witnesses who appeared before us. There were some among them also who supported the Mussalman version as given in the next chapter.

Why Hindus felt aggrieved.

41. For some time prior to June 1928, Mr. Abbas Khan, who was the Municipal President, was taking an active part in carrying out improvements to the City by broadening the roads and their junctions under the personal guidance of the Dewan. In this attempt, certain *aswathakattes*, or raised platforms round peepul trees, which had a religious significance were interfered with on two occasions,—once in December 1927 when two *aswathakattes* attached to Sri Anjaneya Temple in the Yelahanka Gate Square were removed, and later on in June 1928, two others in Kalasipalyam and the Fort. This action was not popular, however well-intentioned it might have been. The removal was effected without regard to Hindu sentiment, while petty Mussalman tombs found in the centre of the roads, for instance, the one in front of the City Market, were allowed to remain without interference. The Hindus who resented this were discussing the matter among themselves but felt powerless to interfere as the President was a Mussalman and he had the support of the Mussalman head of the administration.

42. The discontent became accentuated when the Director of Public Instruction ordered, all of a sudden on 15th June, that the Ganesha should not be restored to its original place within the niche which had been built for it. To the Hindu mind, there was nothing wrong in

* The Committee take no responsibility for the views expressed in this chapter.

constructing the niche as a protection to the image whether it was consecrated and regularly worshipped or not. The image had been there for many years and it had a right to remain there. These rumours spread and the sympathies of all sections of Hindus were enlisted, as testified to by Sir K. P. Puttanna Chetty and other witnesses. It was widely believed that the Director of Public Instruction passed the order under instructions from the Dewan upon the complaint of Mr. Abbas Khan. It was also believed that Mr. Abbas Khan intended to open a road to connect the mosque with Arcot Srinivasa Char Street. Mr. Abbas Khan exhibited his real feelings in the matter when in the presence of the Director of Public Instruction, he charged the Overseer responsible for the repairs to the school with having allowed the construction of the niche without permission.

Unsuccessful press agitation.

43. The question was first taken up on behalf of the boys and the Hindus interested by the Kanarese daily *Veerakesari* on the 27th June 1928, and then by the weekly paper *Visvakarnataka* on the 29th June 1928. Later on, some of the other newspapers also took up the matter. The Director of Public Instruction made light of a representation by *Veerakesari*, and the Government did not acknowledge a letter of 3rd July addressed to the Chief Secretary by the editor of *Visvakarnataka*. The school population, consisting entirely of young Hindu boys of 11 to 14 years of age, were in the habit of worshipping the Ganesha image occasionally and they had taken the trouble to get a niche constructed by the contractor. They were sadly disappointed and aggrieved when they found that they could not restore the image to its old place. Their cause was taken up by Messrs. H. V. Subrahmanyam, Ramlal Thivari and Bhima Rao who were generally taking interest in public movements. There was an outburst of feeling among the students of the Sultanpet School and this came to be shared gradually by students of other schools in the neighbourhood.

The Students' Strike.

44. The strike commenced on the 24th July, and as the authorities took no note of the movement there was no alternative open to the students but to practise *satyagraha* which they did from the 27th evening. Once

satyagraha was commenced, there was no use or meaning in stopping it till the boys secured their object. The authorities concerned should have appreciated the trend of events and adopted measures in good time to restore the image. As the boys were sitting without food in front of the school, braving weather and rain, some of the Hindus naturally took pity on them and provided them with refreshments and food. By this time, the news spread all over the City. Sir K. P. Puttanna Chetty wrote to the Dewan in the matter. There was no conspiracy of any kind; much less was there any need for it. As a matter of fact, some of the leading citizens intervened on the 28th July and earnestly endeavoured to terminate the *satyagraha* by promising to intercede in the matter with the authorities. Neither did the Hindus intend to make this a communal question between the Mussalmans and themselves; it related only to the Hindu community and their grievance was that Government had interfered and would not restore Ganesha to its old place. The incident of a short stoppage of the *gosha* carts near the Girls' School was misconstrued by the Mussalmans. The carts could not pass freely as the road at the time was overcrowded by spectators, for which the boys could not be held responsible. The *satyagrahis* were inside the school compound and the incident occurred outside. On the other hand, the gathering of Mussalmans in groups so early as the 27th July showed that they were watching developments with evil intentions. The Ganesha was restored on the 29th; but the boys had a fresh grievance in that their three leaders were arrested that morning. They resolved to continue the *satyagraha* and declined to worship the image till their leaders were released from prison.

Disturbances on 30th July.

45. On the 30th July, the boys without any guidance from leaders went about the City collecting the boys of other schools, with a view to proceed in a large body and make a representation to higher authorities in order to secure the release of their leaders. There was no other purpose in their mind in approaching the Central Jail, the Dewan's residence or the Public Offices. The boys entertained no idea whatever of causing any harm or committing any acts of violence. When they came to know that the Superintendent of the Jail was powerless to grant them relief, they proceeded to the Dewan's residence to make an

appeal to the head of the administration. Though the Dewan spoke kindly to them, he did not give them a definite reply and it seemed to them that he tried to go away to the Public Offices without redressing their grievance. The boys were disappointed at this and chose to remain where they were. Their behaviour was quiet and orderly until a police sub-inspector used a hunting whip to disperse them. Owing to this, some older boys or adults who happened to be at the gate when the Dewan's car was passing, must have thrown stones at the car, and for this the young boys were in no way responsible. When the horses arrived and the police made it clear to them that they must disperse, they quietly withdrew.

As to their behaviour at the Public Offices, the boys were sitting quietly and showed no disposition to be unruly or violent. It was only when the *sowars*, uncontrolled by the civil authorities, rode through and chased the boys and committed other excesses by using their lances, that the boys retaliated by pelting stones. The young boy Chokkanna, aged 12 years, received an injury over his left ear by a lance thrust by a *sowar*. Student Mylariah who was chased by a *sowar* fell and being trodden by a horse received an injury to his foot with the result that his leg had to be amputated. The calling in of the *sowars* and the use of the military force against young boys roused the sympathy and anger of the parents and the citizens generally. The latter, therefore, mustered strong at the Yelahanka Gate and the Kantaraj Urs Circle, but as soon as the *sowars* were withdrawn, the excitement subsided and the stone-throwing ceased.

Resentment and preparation by Mussalmans.

46. The matter would have ended peacefully when the prisoners were released in the evening; but that was not to be. The Mussalmans kept silent so long as the image remained unrestored, but Mr. Abbas Khan and the Mussalmans in general felt aggrieved when it was put back. On that evening after the restoration of the image, groups of Mussalmans were seen near the bicycle shop and on the road in front of the school. Their movements were suspicious and showed that they probably meant harm to the image. The boys took warning and stood guard over it all night. Mr. H. V. Subrahmanyam complained to the police sergeant on duty on the 27th July

that some stones were thrown from the bicycle shop and the latter warned the people there not to commit mischief. On the 29th July hand-bills were in circulation in the Civil and Military Station misrepresenting many of the facts to the Mussalmans residing there. The Mussalmans of the Civil and Military Station attempted to enter the City that day alone, but were stopped by the authorities near the Queen's Statue.

The discomfiture became worse when the Government yielded to the clamour of the Hindus and released the prisoners. The Mussalmans round about the school with the aid of Mr. Abbas Khan had evidently made preparations for an attack by keeping men ready at the bicycle shop, which was in the occupation of Mussalmans, and providing them with bamboo *lathis* and fire-arms with the object of attacking the Hindus and taking vengeance on the slightest pretext. The Hindu crowds in the processions were most peaceful, since they had secured what they wanted and had nothing to feel sore at. There were no disorders or acts of violence on their part while they were marching along the streets in procession.

Mr. N. Venkatasubbaiya, who was near the school before the procession arrived, saw a large crowd of Mussalmans near Mr. Abbas Khan's house and opposite the bicycle shop. At about 6-30 P.M., Sub-Inspector Seshadri Iyer noticed 3 or 4 Mussalmans going into and coming out of Mr. Abbas Khan's house. Sergeant Venkatesaiya says that when the procession arrived, he observed 8 or 10 Mussalmans inside Mr. Abbas Khan's house and 10 or 15 Mussalmans outside. Market Contractor Mr. Sanjeevappa observed 4 or 5 Moplas walking up and down in Mr. Abbas Khan's compound. Mr. Vajapeyam Venkatasaiya says that there were 10 to 15 Mussalmans close to Mr. B. Srinivasa Iyengar's car when he delivered his speech. During the disturbances, when Messrs. P. Subbarama Chetty and Vajapeyam Venkatesaiya went into Mr. Abbas Khan's compound to protest, they found bundles of green bamboos and men armed with *lathis*.

The Riot (Hindu Version.)

47. It will be seen that the Mussalmans had collected near Mr. Abbas Khan's house and its vicinity evidently prepared to attack the Hindus. When the procession of

the leaders arrived, a large crowd of spectators also followed it but they had no premonition of what was coming. Mr. Belur Srinivasa Iyengar arrived with one of the leaders in a car which stopped at the school gate. He made a short speech containing words of thanksgiving for the success of their efforts in restoring the image and releasing the leaders. The *Mangalarathi* over, the leaders left for their homes. Just at that time stones and old shoes were thrown from the road and Mr. Abbas Khan's house towards the image. An alarm was raised, but before the crowd could realise what was happening, five or six gun-shots were fired from the upper storey of the cycle shop, immediately followed by two or three shots from the upper storey of Mr. Abbas Khan's house. In the confusion and rush that followed, loud cries were heard that some boys were being dragged into Mr. Abbas Khan's house. The Mussalmans inside and in front of Mr. Abbas Khan's house rushed out with *lathis* in hand, and after dividing themselves into two groups proceeded to belabour the Hindus right and left. A panic ensued, and the Hindus who were quite unarmed fled in all directions to escape. More Mussalmans poured in from adjacent lanes and roads and went on attacking the Hindus. The crowd inside the school compound made a rush towards a trap-door in the main gate leading to the Urdu Boys' School in the rear. The trap-door was broken open and many persons escaped in that direction. In a short time the roads were cleared of the Hindus on account of the panic created by the shots. The wounded were removed with some trouble. The whole incident occupied only 20 to 30 minutes. It is also alleged that in the upstair room of Mr. Abbas Khan's house four persons were found lying covered up with cloth in a suspicious position. The Superintendents of Police and the District Magistrate who were present, though repeatedly appealed to to arrest the rowdies and search Mr. Abbas Khan's house for arms and other weapons and for the boys said to have been dragged in, refused to comply and thus failed in their duty.

Panic and stray assaults.

48. After the 30th July, the acts of the authorities increased the tension instead of allaying it. The entire Hindu population in the City was in great consternation. It was unsafe for men and women to move about in the

City and there were numerous assaults on Hindu men and women by Mussalman rowdies. The Police arrangements were quite inadequate and complaints at the police stations went unheeded. While in this state of panic the Hindu residents submitted a memorial to His Highness the Maharaja.

Charge of conspiracy at the Peace Conferences.

49. Then, there were peace conferences held by the Government. In the first conference held on 3rd August, Mr. Abbas Khan and his friends made vehement attacks on Brahmins, both official and non-official, alleging that they had conspired to vilify Mr. Abbas Khan, discredit the Dewan and overthrow the Government. The Brahmins were astounded at this attack cleverly sprung upon them by Mr. Abbas Khan with the sole object of concealing the real issues and screening the offenders. Some of the advocates in the City co-operated to enquire into and meet these unfounded charges in the interests of the community. Finding that they had no proof whatever of any conspiracy, the next move of the associates of Mr. Abbas Khan, at a later stage, was to give this co-operation itself a bad name and call its members conspirators.

Agitation in the Press.

50. Meanwhile, the Government communiques added insult to injury by denying an important occurrence witnessed by hundreds of persons, namely, the shooting on the 30th night, and by characterising the reports in the Press as untrue and mischievous. By this attitude Government showed that they were distinctly prejudiced against the Hindu community. The Press was gagged. The Hindu spokesmen had perforce to seek the columns of foreign newspapers to give expression to their feelings and expose the errors of the Government departments. Some of the Non-Brahmins at the same time fomented communal feelings by writing articles in their own partisan papers, couched often in vulgar and undignified language.

CHAPTER V.

The Mussalman Version.*

Clique or secret society.

51. We next take up the case put forward by witnesses on behalf of the Mussalman community. Some of the Hindu witnesses also who appeared before us supported the Mussalman version. They do not admit that the Ganesha incident is the primary or even the remote cause of the disturbances. According to them, it was only made a pretext of by certain Brahmin agitators out of selfish motives to foment trouble with a view to discredit Mr. Abbas Khan, remove the Dewan and overthrow the constitution. In their view the agitators constitute a "clique" or "secret society." To establish this theory the activities of such agitators are traced back to the days of the Rendition and even to the pre-Rendition period.

According to Mr. Abdur Rahmon, President of the District Board, Bangalore, there has always been in existence a "powerful organization" or a "powerful clique of outsiders" who lost no opportunity of vilifying Mysoreans and keeping them out of power. Whenever a Mysorean was elevated to the Dewanship, there was always a cry raised by this "alien clique."

This struggle between the Madrasis and the Mysoreans continued till 1918 when, according to Mr. Abdur Rahmon, in consequence of the appointment of the Miller Committee to suggest measures for the increased representation of the Non-Brahmins in the services, it gave place to a dispute between the Brahmins, both local and foreign, as a separate class, and the Non-Brahmins. Between 1918 and 1922, the differences between these two communities became accentuated on account of the increased facilities given to the Non-Brahmins to progress by means of the action taken on the Miller Committee Report and the Education Memorandum submitted by the Inspector-General of Education, and the grant of Backward Class Scholarships. By the

*As in the case of Chapter IV, the Committee take no responsibility for the views expressed in this Chapter.

expansion of the Representative Assembly and the Legislative Council also, many Non-Brahmins took the place of Brahmins in these two public bodies. Further, there was discontent among officials at the increased powers given to non-officials in the Government of the country through these two public bodies. The Brahmins whether Madrasis or Mysoreans, therefore, joined hands against the Non-Brahmins and began a campaign against the latter. This new clique of Brahmins could not bear to see a Non-Brahmin as Dewan.

Opposition to the Dewan.

52. After the advent of Mr. Mirza M. Ismail as Dewan, the various factors combined and joined forces a little before the disturbances occurred. Members of this secret society, whose number is variously computed at from 6 to 100, carry on their propaganda through subsidised newspapers in which they publish articles decrying the acts of the Government and showing them up in an unfavourable light. The impecunious editors of certain newspapers are in the pay of this secret society. The members of the society or clique wrote articles in the local and foreign newspapers distorting facts and maliciously depreciating the useful work done in the interests of the country by the present Dewan. There is also a feeling of strong jealousy against the Dewan as he enjoys the special confidence of His Highness the Maharaja, having been his trusted Private Secretary. In July and August 1927 the jealousy increased as the subsidy was reduced by Rs. 10½ lakhs by the Government of India at the time of the Viceregal visit, and also because during the Silver Jubilee the Dewan was honoured with a seat in the howdah on the elephant on which His Highness went in procession in Bangalore City.

Opposition to Mr. Abbas Khan.

53. With this agitation directed against the Dewan is also connected the hostility towards Mr. Abbas Khan who was till recently the President of the City Municipality. He is a leader of the Moslem and other Non-Brahmin causes. He had certain Brahmin friends who supported his candidature to the Municipal Presidentship against the opposing candidate, but who later on fell out with him and joined the secret society to work against both Mr. Abbas Khan and the Dewan.

While matters were in this state, in the March (1928) session of the Legislative Council, one of the Non-Brahmin members felt aggrieved at the attitude of Government towards certain interpellations put by him. His resentment was shared by some of his colleagues. During the session of the Representative Assembly in June 1928, an organised movement was got up on purpose to put certain interpellations and thereby create a sensation, as the organisers expected that the Government would necessarily disallow such questions and put themselves in the wrong. Events having turned out as they expected there was a walk-out from the Assembly of certain Non-Brahmin and Brahmin Members on the ground of alleged insult offered by the Dewan-President. In that walk-out Mr. Abbas Khan did not join. From that time there was a split in the Non-Brahmin camp, and Mr. Abbas Khan was boycotted by some of his erstwhile political associates. Those opposed to him made common cause and joined in furthering the aims of the secret society, which according to him were "to overthrow the Government, dislodge the Dewan, and vilify me and bring me into trouble." They were sending out circulars all over the State secretly and inciting people against the Government.

The conspiracy theory.

54. About this time certain peepul trees and temple lands and buildings were interfered with in connection with the Bangalore City improvements. Though similar measures had often been adopted before with regard to peepul trees, Hindu temples, musjids, chatrams and even Christian churches, nobody had ever taken any serious notice of such acts, but now the agitators set up people to work against the Government. It was in such an atmosphere that the Ganesha incident occurred and that was a godsend to the agitators. The Director of Public Instruction was right in preventing the restoration of the image so that a temple may not grow in the compound of a public school. Seeing that the young boys would naturally be interested in the restoration of Ganesha, the clique set them up nearly a month after the order of the Director of Public Instruction and actively helped them to agitate, themselves remaining behind the scenes.

"What has the Ganapathi affair to do with overthrowing the Government?" Mr. Abbas Khan was asked.

Answer—"It came in handy at the time.
Question—Why was it taken up?'

A—Because Ganapathi is a god universally respected and worshipped by all the Hindu communities, all the Non-Brahmins were expected to join.
Q—Join whom?

A—Join Brahmins. There is no difference of opinion in this matter between a Brahmin and a Non-Brahmin. It is all done by a secret society. Their mental faculties took it up and developed it.
Q—For what purpose?

A—To denounce Government. There might be mill strikes also they thought because they could easily bring them about as they had done so formerly. They will do anything to discredit the Government in the eyes of the public both in Mysore and British India."

Considering their attitude and their regular propaganda even if the Ganesha affair had not occurred, the agitators who were waiting for an opportunity would have taken advantage of some other incident to rouse discontent among the people, and somehow brought about disturbances sooner or later.

"I am personally aware," says Mr. Abbas Khan, "of certain facts to show and to prove that there is a conspiracy, and that there is a secret society conspiring to do these things. All these things have taken place under the organization of that society. This agitation was got up by that society, financed by that society, while the students were fed by that society. There was a real organization to attack the Central Jail, the Dewan's residence and the Public Offices in three places and in three groups. All this was done in an organized manner."

Incidents due to Agitators' instigation.

55. It is in the light of these circumstances that the disturbances and the causes underlying them have to be judged. The Ganesha affair would have passed off quietly were it not exaggerated to suit the convenience of these scheming agitators. Mr. Abbas Khan had no hand in the order passed by the Director; in fact, he openly

stated so to the editor of the *Veerakesari* and even offered to subscribe for the restoration of the image. The Mussalmans had no objection to the Ganesha remaining where it was, or even in the niche; what they and Mr. Abbas Khan who live in the locality objected to was the construction of a large temple in a Mussalman locality, which they learnt was in contemplation. The leaders who set up the boys, especially Mr. Subrahmanyam, made violent speeches provoking the Mussalmans and inciting the boys to acts of violence in order to attain their object.

Mr. Subrahmanyam, in the course of a speech at the Market Square on the evening of the 25th July 1928, compared the proportion of Mussalmans to Hindus in the Mysore State to a handful of pebbles in a bag of rice, which could be easily picked out and thrown away. A Mussalman by-stander on hearing this retorted that a maund of fuel was sufficient to boil a *palla* of rice whereas stones could never be boiled. Mr. Subrahmanyam also said that the Mussalmans taking advantage of the head of the administration being a member of their community, were doing a lot of mischief and that the Hindus should arm themselves with sharp weapons as a protection against rowdy Mussalmans. In the course of his further harangues he also made uncomplimentary references to the present administration and the Mussalmans in general who, he said, were taking this opportunity to "lay the axe at the root of Hindu society."

The marching of the boys and the violence displayed by them at the Central Jail, the Dewan's residence and the Public Offices were all premeditated and formed part of the scheme to bring the Government into disrepute. The boys insulted Muslim girls going in *gosha* carts to the Urdu Girls' School next to Mr. Abbas Khan's house by stopping and interfering with the carts. The Mussalmans felt aggrieved but, nevertheless, on the advice of the police, restrained themselves expecting that the authorities would take necessary action.

56. On the evening of the 30th July there was no gathering of Hindu boys near the school. According to a notice put up at the gate in the morning, a meeting was to be held on the Gandhi Maidan. Neither Mr. Abbas Khan nor any of the Mussalmans knew that the leaders

would be released in the evening or would be brought to the school in procession and there was no reason for them to make any previous preparation. Mr. Abbas Khan was, therefore, surprised to find a crowd coming to the school shouting and abusing him and the Dewan. Mr. Belur Srinivasa Iyengar standing in a motor car in front of the school gate made a vehement speech pointing to Mr. Abbas Khan's house and accusing the owner of being responsible for all the trouble and the privations undergone by the boys. The speech was punctuated by the cries of the crowd, "Abbas Khan is dead" and "Dewan is dead." At the signal of a pre-arranged whistle the excited crowd began to pelt stones at and attack Mr. Abbas Khan's house. Mr. Abbas Khan and his son put out the lights and stood on the landing of the upper storey, looking at the crowd through the glass shutters of the windows. Mr. Abbas Khan's son received an injury on the forehead from a stone which cut through a glass pane. At about the same time a Hindu mob of about one or two hundred people armed with sticks rushed into the compound shouting, "Where is Abbas Khan? Drag him out. Pull the women out. Burn his house." A servant of his who was in the compound was attacked and had his arm fractured. The crowd tried to rush into the house. The women and children in the house, numbering about a dozen, were terrified and began to cry, and Mr. Abbas Khan himself became unnerved not knowing what to do.

57. It is not known where the Mussalmans came from and how the attacks on the Hindus ensued. A probable explanation is that the stones pelted by the crowd fell on the corrugated iron roofing of the Musjid behind Mr. Abbas Khan's house and created a great noise; the Mussalmans residing in the locality were surprised, and upon hearing of an attack on Mr. Abbas Khan's house rushed out and perhaps attacked some of the rowdy elements among the Hindus. The provocation first came from the Hindus. There was no shooting from Mr. Abbas Khan's house or at his instance. It is said that shots were fired from the cycle shop; if that is true, the responsibility for it cannot be fixed. After the first disturbance, the Hindus gathered again in the adjoining streets, and picking up pieces of casuarina wood from the adjacent fuel depots belaboured the Mussalmans wherever they found them and inflicted severe injuries on many.

After the cavalry arrived and the police were reinforced, Mr. Abbas Khan on the advice of a cavalry officer removed his family in his motor car to Hebbal where a relation of his lived; the same car made two trips to remove the inmates in two batches.

Some of the Mussalmans of the Civil and Military Station also came to the City in the evening having heard a rumour that the Dewan was wounded and Mr. Abbas Khan's house was attacked. There was also a stray rumour that the mill hands would go on strike and demolish the Muslim tomb in the City Market Square. The Mussalmans were all in a panic as they feared that their houses would be attacked by the Hindus. There were really no communal differences between the two communities, and the rash acts, if any, of individual Mussalmans should not be put to the account of the Moslem community as a whole, as is sought to be done by the Brahmin local press and by the Hindu correspondents of the foreign press.

CHAPTER VI.

Principal Incidents Examined.

58. The principal incidents connected with the disturbances may be grouped into three main classes, namely :—

(1) Incidents up to 29th July inclusive;
(2) Incidents on 30th July till 7 P.M. ; and
(3) Rioting on the night of 30th July.

Some stray assaults which took place after the 30th July which are also a result of the disturbances are dealt with in the next chapter.

Incidents up to 29th July inclusive.

59. While the niche was being constructed by the contractor at the request of the boys, the image had been stowed away by them in a passage at the south-west corner of the school building. The Director of Public Instruction at his visit to the school on 15th June gave an order to the Head Master not to restore the image to its old place in the open compound until a decision was reached after consulting Government if necessary. This was in consequence of a letter from the Private Secretary to the Dewan to the Director of Public Instruction requesting the latter to look into the matter and not to encourage the construction of a temple which may eventually lead to communal friction. Mr. Abbas Khan has stated that he had brought the matter to the notice of the Dewan, and possibly also other Mussalmans had done the same. They naturally apprehended trouble and offence to their religious feelings, in consequence of the construction of a niche in a Mussalman neighbourhood and close to a mosque.

The students of the Sultanpet A.-V. School who were generally boys of between 11 and 14 years of age demanded of the Head Master to restore the Ganesha image. They were expecting restoration from day to day till the 23rd July and being naturally disappointed, they struck work on the 24th and refused to attend the classes. On the 23rd evening, Mr. Subrahmanyam and subsequently two

other leaders encouraged the boys in their obstinacy, and thereafter batches of boys went round in procession through the streets attempting to induce the students of other educational institutions to join them in their demonstrations of protest.

60. The street in front of the school, that is, between Mr. Abbas Khan's house and the school gate, was now and then crowded with boys and spectators who obstructed the traffic. The boys also sang *bhajanas* or hymns which seemed to have caused annoyance to Mussalmans visiting the mosque. The stopping of *gosha* carts of school girls, the incident referred to in paragraph 18, also gave offence to members of that community. We believe that during the processions in the streets, the boys shouted opprobrious references to Mr. Abbas Khan. The speeches of Mr. Subrahmanyam in the Municipal Garden and the City Market Square were also provocative. On the 26th July the students visited the schools in the Malleswaram area to induce the boys of those schools to join them in the strike, and the Head Master of a Primary School was maltreated by the boys because he objected to their interfering with his school.

Whatever may have been the results from the point of view of maintaining law and order, the police behaved leniently towards the boys up to the 29th July. As the boys received no check, they seem to have been emboldened and become more and more unruly. They were encouraged in this attitude by the leaders. The Hindu public who were at first amused by the enthusiasm or the antics of the boys gradually began to sympathise with them. The Press too used this occasion for an attack on the Education Department and also on Government on account of their alleged indifference to the feelings of the Hindu community. Whether from religious motives or out of sympathy with the boys, certain Hindu residents distributed food to them.

61. On a consideration of all aspects of these incidents up to 29th July, we are of opinion that Mr. Abbas Khan was justified in making a representation to Government not to allow a niche or temple to grow up in the school compound facing his house, and directly opposite to a minaret of the mosque immediately behind his house. The Government were also justified in asking the Director

of Public Instruction "to look into the matter and see what could be done to stop the construction of the temple." It is clear to us that at that time the niche itself was interpreted as a temple. There is no evidence to show that the construction of any larger structure was contemplated; any such idea was most unlikely. The Director of Public Instruction was equally right in using his discretion and detaining the image till he had taken time to consider the whole question fully.

Up to this point there was nothing for anybody to complain about. The accident that the Dewan and the President of the Municipality were co-religionists and Mussalmans, should not be allowed to influence our judgment in forming opinions so far.

62. What went wrong in this whole affair seems to be that while each party kept the matter secret and mystified the situation by his attitude, the public knew more or less the whole truth. For example, Mr. Abbas Khan subsequently disowned his interference in this matter in a statement made to the editor of *Veerakesari* and also in a manifesto which he signed in the Municipal Office along with other Hindu citizens offering to co-operate with them to see the image restored. The attitude of the Government and the Director of Public Instruction, as well as the subsequent Government Communique No. I and the discussions at the Peace Conference on 3rd August, made it appear as if the Director of Public Instruction was alone concerned and that he passed the order for the non-restoration of the image on his own initiative. Had the facts been all openly stated, Government might have passed orders on the merits of the case to the satisfaction of all parties concerned without giving room for any suspicion or comment. A reasonable order could have been passed either to restore the image to its old place after demolishing the niche or to provide some other less prominent or objectionable site for it after consulting all the interests concerned. Such a course would have given no room for complaint.

Incidents on 30th July till 7 p.m.

63. The three leaders were arrested and sent to Jail on the 29th July. On the afternoon of the same date, the image was restored

Boys at Carlton House.

to its original place. The students felt hurt at the arrest and imprisonment of their leaders and went in large numbers to the Central Jail where the leaders had been incarcerated. Not being able to do anything there, they made for Carlton House, the residence of the Dewan, to demand the release of the prisoners. The Dewan tried to reason with them and promised that orders would be passed after he went to the office. This did not satisfy the boys some of whom lay across the path to prevent the Dewan's car passing out. When they were pulled out and the car was emerging from the entrance, stones were thrown at the car which injured the glass panes.

Boys at the Public Offices.

64. The behaviour of the mob at the Public Offices was a more serious affair. When they went there in large numbers and some of them had gone from Carlton House, the Lancers were brought to clear the crowd. As the *sowars* attempted to disperse the mob, the boys picked up road metal and flung at them. The *sowars* had orders to use only the butt and not the point of the lance; but on being subjected to rough treatment and being angered, some of the *sowars* who, judging from their exclamations, were either Mussalmans or Mahrattas lost their temper and scared and ill-treated the boys. This behaviour of the *sowars*, considering the risks and provocations they were subjected to, was not unnatural. But, when the Military are called out in emergencies like this, the law provides that they should act under the orders of a magistrate whenever possible. This they failed to do on this occasion. The military officers in command either did not know, or, as the emergency was unexpected, they paid no particular heed to these formalities. The civil authorities who requisitioned the Military should have directed the movements of the latter. In this respect, the responsibility was greater on their shoulders than on the Military.

Mob at the Central Jail and the Yelahanka Gate.

65. Large crowds of people were attracted by the report that boys were being pursued by the Lancers. The latter had instructions to guard some of the principal roads leading to the Central Jail and to prevent the mobs going in that direction. The presence of the *sowars* at the Yelahanka Gate irritated the boys and their adult sympathisers who by this time had come in large numbers

to their help. The same struggle as was carried on near the Public Offices was re-enacted here. The boys had no real leaders. They had by this time become completely demoralised. They were freely pelting stones at the *sowars* and the *sowars* in turn chased them as well as their adult supporters. Dr. E. P. Metcalfe, Principal of the Central College, whose house is close to the Central Jail and who was watching the events, has stated that there was no excuse at all for the boys to behave in the manner they did. Several boys were injured and some sowars were seriously wounded; happily there were no deaths.

66. The *sowars* at the Central Jail were received with a shower of stones. We are satisfied that the *sowars* did chase not only the boys and their adult supporters but also some of the passers-by along the roads whom they mistook for instigators. The *sowars* also on occasions pointed the lances at the boys and others in a threatening attitude but they do not seem to have deliberately used them to cause injury. Any deliberate use might have proved fatal. The injury to the boy Chokkanna brought to our notice must have been caused by an accidental contact with a lance. The boys proved unruly at Carlton House and offensive in their behaviour at the Public Offices. They had demanded entrance into the Central Jail on the night of the 29th July and they went there twice again in large numbers on the following day. The excesses committed by the boys were in no way justifiable. It was necessary to disperse the crowd because being largely reinforced by the adult population from the City it might have proved a source of danger. As the police force available was scattered all over the City and was insufficient, we consider that it was quite necessary to seek the aid of the Military for restoring order. Government officers were well advised in calling in the Military.

Rioting on the night of 30th July.

Rioting at the Sultanpet A. V. School.

67. The riot began a little after 7 P.M. The released leaders were brought to the A. V. School carried on men's shoulders in a triumphant manner, and just as the *pooja* was being performed and the first batch had left, it is stated that stones and two or three slippers were thrown towards the image. This was either from the road or

from persons who had collected in the compound of the house of Mr. Abbas Khan. It is also stated that for two or three days previously, groups of Mussalmans were watching the performances of the boys and passing and repassing the school in a sulky mood. This seems to have brought quite a number of Mussalmans to the site of the mosque and to the house of Mr. Abbas Khan.

It is stated that shortly after the shower of stones and shoes, five or six shots from a revolver came from the upper storey of the cycle shop and two or three shots from the upper storey of Mr. Abbas Khan's house. At the same time some 15 Mussalmans, armed with *lathis*, rushed out of Mr. Abbas Khan's house. Whether they were previously allowed to collect there or whether they got into Mr. Abbas Khan's house through the mosque premises by climbing over a wall which divided the mosque from the house, it is not made quite clear. But there is enough evidence to show that a batch of men armed with *lathis* issued from the house about the time of the firing. The armed Mussalmans attacked the Hindu crowd which was unarmed. The Hindu crowd receded some distance towards the north or Chickpet side; but it would not disperse because cries had been heard that some boys had been dragged into Mr. Abbas Khan's house and they wanted to know what had become of them.

68. A few witnesses have deposed that boys were dragged or forced into Mr. Abbas Khan's house. One witness has deposed that he saw four boys lying prostrate, face downwards, on the first floor of the same house. Another witness has stated that there was suspicious washing of a room in Mr. Abbas Khan's house probably to remove blood-stains. It is also being freely hinted that since a car took persons twice from the house and a single bullock cart is also said to have left it, both being covered over with cloth as if they contained *gosha* women, some dead bodies might have been smuggled in that manner. The police though stationed at or near the house could not and did not see what these conveyances contained.

On a careful analysis of the evidence which came before us, we find that there is not sufficient evidence in regard to the bullock cart incident. We are unable to place any belief in the allegation that any person, boy or

man, was killed. If any boys had been killed, evidence would have been forthcoming that boys were missing. The parents and neighbours would not have remained silent. We made most careful enquiries. We gave the fullest scope for all the evidence that could be brought on the point; but not one authenticated case of a missing boy was established up to the last day on which we took evidence. We can only surmise that the witnesses were influenced by the cries that boys had been dragged in. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence that people were going in and out of Mr. Abbas Khan's house on the night of the riot. If any crimes had been committed, the inmates would not have taken the risk of exposing them. The evidence of Chauffeur Chinnaswamy does not appear to be probable.

Injuries during disturbances.

69. How many were actually injured in the riot on the night of 30th July, it is impossible to say. But some idea may be gathered from the admissions into the hospitals. The total admissions of injured on the 30th July were 134 civilians. Of these, 76 were injured at the Sultanpet School, 5 at the Public Offices, 4 at the Central Jail, and 1 at Carlton House. The places where the remaining persons were injured cannot be ascertained. The number of Hindus injured was 123. The number of Mussalmans injured at Sultanpet School was only 2 and in other places in the City 9, making a total of 11 according to the hospital statistics. Of the injuries to 134 civilians, 4 cases were serious, namely, 1 bullet wound and 3 bone fractures. Leaving out the civil population, 6 policemen, all of them Hindus, were injured in the Sultanpet riot. They also bore marks of contusions. The injuries to the Central Jail staff, of which there were 9 cases were all contusions. Among the 50 Military who were wounded, three have been grievously hurt and seven have had contusions. The remaining injuries were of a simple character. (App. vii.)

70. There is overwhelming evidence to show that shots were fired from the cycle shop. It is probable they were fired into the air. Two or three shots were also fired from opposite the school. We have come to this conclusion from the evidence of numerous witnesses, high and low, old and young, taken along with medical

evidence and probabilities. We are aware that some respectable witnesses have stated that they did not notice any shots coming from opposite the school. This can be accounted for by the noise and confusion which prevailed after the first shots from the cycle shop were fired and by the anxiety of every one to fly for his life. Probably two persons were hit ; one at least is certain. The tailor boy, Chandra Raj, was one of the persons hit by shots which came from opposite the school. It is possible that the person who fired from opposite the school took the cue from the first firing from the cycle shop, but instead of firing into the air fired into the crowd.

The majority of members entertain no doubt that there was shooting from the cycle shop as well as from opposite the school. The shots in the latter case might have come from the house of Mr. Abbas Khan or the compound of his house or they may be from the road outside the compound wall.

Our colleague, Mr. G. A. Kalami, does not believe that there was any shooting at all.

Mr. B. Nagappa wishes to dissociate himself from the opinions expressed in the whole of this chapter because he does not feel that he is called upon to express an opinion on the events of the night of the 30th July.

71. The *lathi* men may have gone to and collected in the house of Mr. Abbas Khan voluntarily to give him protection and Mr. Abbas Khan could have known they were there. The riot began by the Mussalmans throwing stones and shoes at the image. The jubilation of the crowd must have provoked them though that was not sufficient justification for them to take to physical violence and crime. We are inclined to hold that the Mussalmans who collected in Mr. Abbas Khan's house and from the neighbourhood had come there prepared for the attack on the slightest pretext or no pretext at all. Many Mussalmans had been roused by the incidents of that and the previous days.

The boys had no special motive to take the initiative ; we do find however that they did throw stones at Mr. Abbas Khan's house but only after seeing shoes and

stones hurled at the image by Mussalmans from his house or the road.

72. We have not got sufficient evidence to indicate a prolonged period of active preparation on the part of the Mussalmans for a deliberate attack. At the same time, we are unable to accept the explanation that the procession was wholly unexpected at the school. During the day a rumour had got abroad both in the City and the Civil and Military Station that the Dewan had been injured and there was a likelihood of the house of Mr. Abbas Khan and the mosque behind it being attacked. It was well known that the *mangalarathi* would take place after the release of the leaders. When the processions left the Central Jail, there was sufficient time for the news to spread among the Muslims of the approach of the processions. They were sulky at the provocation received, and the feeling that the image had been restored and the information that the leaders were released must have incensed them and led to the open attack. The jubilation of the crowd which approached the school in a triumphant mood must have added to the resentment.

CHAPTER VII.

What followed the Rioting.

Measures taken to restore order after the riot.

73. The riot already described occurred between 7-15 and 7-45 P.M. on the 30th July. In the course of that riot, the Mussalmans attacked the Hindu crowd with *lathis* and knives, and shooting also occurred. Yet no steps were taken to surround the houses from which the shots or armed men came nor to arrest the offenders. Not only this, for nearly four days after the riot no serious effort was made to collect evidence or trace the offenders.

The Inspector-General of Police was himself temporarily disabled by the attack made on him. The District Superintendent of Police did not take command of the situation as he should have done in such an emergency, and he made much of the fact that he was ordinarily dissociated from the direct administration of the City Police. The Assistant Superintendent of Police who was in immediate charge of the City also behaved as if no action was expected from him. They both arrived at the scene of the Sultanpet disturbances within half an hour after the rioting. By that time the crowds in front of the A.-V. School had dispersed, evidently through fear instilled by the shooting, but rowdy elements were still lingering here and there, and the two communities had divided themselves into warring mobs along the road on opposite sides of the school. The District Superintendent of Police, who is a Mussalman, posted himself near the Mussalman crowd to keep order, and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, who is a Hindu, took his place on the side of the Hindu crowd for the same purpose.

74. It was not unreasonable to expect that a cordon should have been placed round the houses from which the shooting came, but the information that shots were fired was ignored although it had reached the ears of the District Magistrate and the Police Officers. Both the District Magistrate and the Inspector-General of Police have stated that they had not sufficient force with them to take action in the manner mentioned and even on the

following day they were too busy with the maintenance of law and order amidst an excited population to think of any investigation or arrests. We think, however, that the houses could have been surrounded as soon as the Lancers and the Reserve Police arrived, and a few of the malefactors arrested from whom important clues might have been obtained.

The 31st July was a day of great excitement but Government made all proper arrangements for maintaining law and order within the City. In addition to the Lancers belonging to the State Military Force, they requisitioned armoured cars from the British garrison stationed in the Bangalore Cantonment. The only omission was that no one seems to have given a serious thought to the necessity of an investigation, even on the 31st, into the crimes of the previous night. On the 31st July there was sufficient force for all purposes and it was easy to detach and detail on that date a small portion of the police under a magistrate exclusively for investigation duty.

We are not prepared to subscribe to the view that in cases of rioting like this, particularly where members of the police force themselves were injured, no attempt should be made at investigation or arrests until order was completely restored.

Stray assaults after 30th July.

75. On account of the estrangement of feeling created between the two communities on the 30th July, stray assaults continued to be committed during the days immediately following the riot. Twenty-three cases of such communal assaults were reported till 1st September 1928 in the Bangalore City. Twenty of these assaults are ascribed to unknown Mussalmans. In 14 cases, two or more than two unknown Mussalmans are reported to have participated, and in 6 cases one Mussalman was the assailant. In 3 cases of assaults by a single Mussalman, the accused have been identified by name. In 3 only out of the 23 cases reported were the assailants Hindus. (Appendix viii.)

Six cases of rumoured assaults were found to be false on verification in the Bangalore City. In the Bangalore District, that is, in the area close to the City of Bangalore, there were reported to Government five incidents of a

communal nature between the 30th July and 21st September. In other parts of the State, there were 12 such incidents between the same dates. There was one serious riot at Davangere in connection with the Ganesha procession on the 21st September in which several persons were injured and 13 were charge-sheeted by the Police. It is learnt that the leaders of the two communities in that town composed their differences within a very short time. In the Kolar District there were seven cases; in Bangalore District three; in Tumkur District two; and in Chitaldrug District one, involving interference with temples. There were two cases in the Bangalore District of *idgahs* (Mussalman places of prayer) having been damaged. In three cases of Hindu temples, the idols were damaged. Besides these, there are rumours of two cases of injuries to Hindu idols in Tumkur District which remain unverified.

It has been alleged that the police did not readily attend to complaints from the public in the case of these stray assaults in the Bangalore City. From our enquiries we feel that there was no reasonable ground for this. Many of the complaints might have been due to the panic with which the public were seized. We feel no doubt that, if some of the offenders at least connected with the rioting of the 30th night had been arrested, fear would have been instilled in the mind of the rowdy elements and these stray assaults might to a large extent have been averted. On the whole, we have no reason to think that the police arrangements in the City after the 30th July were either insufficient or unsatisfactory.

Appointment of an Investigating Magistrate.

76. It appears that at the Dewan's residence on the morning of the 31st July, at which the heads of departments of Government and some non-officials also were present, it was decided to appoint Mr. R. Thammaji Rao as a Special Investigating Magistrate. As each community appeared to have entertained a suspicion that the police sided with the other, the Government decided upon an enquiry by a Magistrate. Owing to this decision, the police seem to have considered themselves as relieved of any responsibility for investigation. The order of the appointment of Mr. R. Thammaji Rao as a First Class Magistrate was issued to him on the evening of 2nd August. He was not relieved of his routine duties till the

evening of 4th August, and on the night of 4th August, Government changed the officer because by that time it was considered that a more senior officer was needed for this duty. Mr. C. Machia, Municipal Commissioner for the Bangalore City, was appointed an Additional District Magistrate and he took over his new duties on 6th August. This slow action and these changes must necessarily have led to the obliteration of much of the evidence of the crimes committed on the night of the 30th July. The appointment of a junior officer at first and then of another, who, though a senior officer, was at the time associated with Mr. Abbas Khan in the Municipal administration of the Bangalore City, was not considered particularly happy and was not calculated to ease the tension in the public mind.

Conferences between Government and leaders.

77. Government convened two conferences in order to discuss the situation with the leaders of the two communities with an eye to restoring communal harmony. The conference of the 3rd August is reported to have, if anything, accentuated the differences on account of the strong language used by some of the leaders. At that conference, Mr. Abbas Khan for the first time expounded a theory that the disturbances were chiefly due to a conspiracy by the Brahmin community, or, as he put it later, by a section of that community. He stated that the community aided by the Press were bent upon vilifying him, removing the Dewan from office and overthrowing the Government. The Hindu leaders, particularly the Brahmin community, were dissatisfied on this account.

The second conference which was held on the 20th August was of a more fruitful character. At that conference the Government announced their intention to appoint a committee of enquiry. Representative men of both communities assured Government that there was really no ill-feeling as such between the Hindus and Mussalmans in the State, the disturbances were the creation of a few rowdy elements and the two communities were willing to live as before in amity and cordiality. The leaders from the *mofussil* stations attributed much of the ill-feeling to the accounts circulated by the vernacular Press in the *mofussil*. There was distinct evidence at that conference that the ill-feeling raised by the disturbances had begun to disappear.

78. The District Magistrate suspended some of the newspapers on the ground that they were publishing articles calculated to foment communal tension and exaggerated accounts of the happenings. Four papers were suspended on 1st August and one on the 2nd, that is, in all five. This embargo was withdrawn on one paper on the 13th August and on the remaining four on the 17th of the same month, by which time the excitement had quieted down to some extent. The local papers published recriminations between the communities and attacks on Government. The papers outside the State also published exaggerated accounts under sensational headings, such as, "Rebellion in Bangalore and Government Blunders," "Reign of Terror in Mysore," "Police open fire on students," and so on. As some of the local papers showed a tendency to spread exaggerated reports and comments on Government measures in violent and undignified language, and as this happened at a time of intense excitement, we are not prepared to say that the suspension of such papers at such a time was altogether unnecessary. The object of the suspension of the local papers was, however, to some extent frustrated because some of the matter which would have appeared in them found its way to the outside Press. We recognise that the ban on the Press is an extraordinary measure and one which should be resorted to only in grave emergencies.

Suspension of Newspapers.

79. Several communiques were issued by Government after the riot of 30th July night. The first of these was dated 31st July, and twelve Communiques in all were issued up to 7th September. Leaving out minor points as well as others in regard to which allowance should be made for differences of opinion, there were two incidents in respect of which the Communiques were distinctly in error. Communique No. I seemed to imply that the Director of Public Instruction happened to visit the Sultanpet A.-V. School on 15th June and casually observed a newly built niche. Three Communiques, namely, Nos. II, V and X, dated respectively, 31st July, 2nd August and 10th August, denied that there was any shooting. Two of these were emphatic; they averred that there was no shooting whatever. In other respects, the Communiques generally had the effect of allaying unrest, at any rate in the *mofussil* where the rural population was dependent on the vernacular papers for its news.

Government Communiques.

CHAPTER VIII.

Origin and Causes of Disturbances.

80. Having in the last two chapters dealt with the history of, and the individual incidents connected with, the disturbances, we will now endeavour to give a connected account of the causes as ascertained in the course of the enquiry. We will take up the direct and the more immediate causes first.

Direct Causes.

81. The initial mistake arose in allowing a niche to be constructed for Ganesha without proper authority. The construction of the niche was calculated to enhance the importance of the image and the ceremonies associated with it, and this gave rise to apprehensions in the mind of Mr. Abbas Khan and his co-religionists residing in that neighbourhood. Then came the order from the Director of Public Instruction, and his statement that he passed the order on his own initiative. The Hindus all the while knew that the non-restoration of the image was the result of a reference by Government at the instance of Mr. Abbas Khan and perhaps also of his Mussalman neighbours, and they felt that while their own feelings were ignored, those of the Mussalmans received greater consideration. There was also the impression that Mr. Abbas Khan had the backing of the Dewan which in their view accounted for the Director of Public Instruction's interference and the non-restoration of the image. The Hindus felt aggrieved at the thought that acts repugnant to their religion should have been countenanced by Government at the instance of a Mussalman citizen.

82. The calling in of the Military on the 30th July to disperse the crowd and their rudeness to the boys when provoked caused excitement among the Hindu population who gathered in large numbers and went to the aid of the boys.

The unruly conduct of the boys and the insults hurled by their leaders between the 24th and 29th July provoked

the anger of the Mussalmans. Many of them were nursing resentment and when they found that Government had yielded to the clamour of the Hindus, restored the image and released the leaders, their feelings became intense. Thereafter, they were inclined to take the matter into their own hands and to await an opportunity to revenge themselves on the boys and their Hindu supporters.

The riot might have been averted if the released leaders had been quietly escorted to their homes, or if the police (or the Military, if necessary) had accompanied the procession, or if due warning had been given of the release from the Central Jail and the police were present at the Sultanpet School in sufficient force at the time of the evening worship. But none of these precautions was taken.

Indirect Causes.

83. We have so far dealt with the causes which directly led to the disturbances and we will now proceed to narrate the indirect causes which influenced the course of events.

Influence of political parties opposed to Government.

84. Several witnesses, prominent among whom may be mentioned Mr. Abdul Rahmon and Mr. Nilgiri Sanjeeviah, traced the origin of political differences between the several classes and communities, which have been growing in the State for a long series of years commencing from the Rendition. At the time of the Rendition there was political rivalry between the Madras and Mysore Brahmins, but the former secured the ascendancy which they maintained during a period of about 20 years or till 1901. Then followed a time when both Mysore and Madras Brahmins were in power at intervals. From 1919 up to date, the office of Dewan has been in the hands of Non-Brahmins.

The Miller Committee proposals which had for their object the more extended employment of members of the Non-Brahmin community in the public service were sanctioned by Government in the year 1921. Whatever its beneficent effects may have been, it led to a sharp cleavage of interests and sympathies between Brahmins and Non-Brahmins. All these vicissitudes have resulted in the

formation of a few distinct groups or parties in the State and there is rivalry among them for official preferment.

In June 1927, the present Dewan, who is a Mussalman and a Mysorean, endeavoured to adopt a conciliatory policy, and in his time, certain slight modifications were made in the Miller Committee order. This pleased neither party and in the March session of the Legislative Council of the current year, certain Non-Brahmin leaders felt aggrieved at the attitude of Government. This was accentuated in the June session of the Representative Assembly when a group of Non-Brahmin, along with some Brahmin, members walked out of the Assembly as a protest against the Government attitude. There was, therefore, at the time the Ganesha incident started a number of disgruntled politicians opposed to, and bent upon discrediting, the present administration.

It came out also in the course of the evidence that the present Dewan was particularly attacked in the Press at the instance of certain non-Mysoreans for supporting two large productive schemes started by a previous Mysorean Dewan. But the schemes in question had originated a long time ago and were maintained by other administrators also before the present Dewan came to office. He was only continuing the policy of his predecessors.

All such dissatisfaction cannot by itself be said to have originated the disturbances, but it certainly added to the intensity of feeling against, and suspicion in the good intentions of, the administration.

Influence of Municipal Parties in the City.

85. Since 1924 there has been keen rivalry for securing the office of the President of the Municipal Council for the City of Bangalore between Mr. Abbas Khan and Mr. B. K. Garudachar and each had his supporters. A fresh election and nomination of the Municipal Councillors and election of the President was due in 1927. The Government nominated certain councillors and Mr. Abbas Khan was elected as President in the month of November of that year. In the course of these proceedings, somehow an impression gained abroad that Government were unduly favouring the cause of Mr. Abbas Khan. In the Representative Assembly "walk-out" in June

1928, already mentioned, Mr. Abbas Khan dissociated himself from certain leaders of the Non-Brahmin party and took the side of Government. We have referred to the unpopularity of Mr. Abbas Khan with certain orthodox Hindus in connection with the demolition of a few *Aswathakattes*. All these incidents led to popular dislike and opposition to the doings and influence of Mr. Abbas Khan in the City.

It was in such an atmosphere that the Ganesha incident came in. The dislike of, and the spirit of opposition to, Mr. Abbas Khan added importance to the incident. The development of this incident, though well known in the City, was not actively discouraged by Hindu citizens in its initial stages, probably because they did not altogether disapprove of an agitation against Mr. Abbas Khan. Some of the Municipal Councillors and other citizens later tried to stop *satyagraha* on the 28th July, but it was too late.

Propaganda and hostility of the local Press.

86. The local Press was also a contributory cause. For one reason or other, a few local papers had taken up a hostile attitude towards Government at the time the Ganesha incident began and they gave wide publicity to particulars relating to the incident and the suspicions of the public already described. Five papers in particular took part, namely, *Veerakesari*, *Viswakarnataka*, *Prajamitra*, *Navajivana* and *The Mysore Star*. The *Veerakesari* conducted the bulk of the agitation and wrote biting articles in its issues of June 27th and 28th, and July, 4, 12, 16, 19, 20, 23 and 24 to 30. The paper suggested that the order of the Director of Public Instruction not to restore the image was high-handed and that it was probably inspired by Mr. Abbas Khan and had the support of Government. The paper cautioned Government that the matter was likely to spread to the whole State, that it was likely to be taken up by the entire Hindu community and might lead to a catastrophe.

The *Viswakarnataka* in its issue of July 8 referred to the editor's letters to the Director of Public Instruction as well as to the Chief Secretary to Government and cautioned Government that unless the matter was promptly settled it might mean danger to existing Hindu-Muslim

cordiality. An article of June 27 in the *Prajamitra* recalled the historic parallel of the acts of Ghazni Mahomed and strongly deprecated the alleged iconoclastic tendencies of the Government authorities at the time.

Conspiracy Theory.

87. In the course of the evidence it was alleged that there were a number of persons who were secretly plotting to discredit the administration by spreading rumours by means of anonymous communications and sending circulars to kindred spirits in *mofussil* stations. This conspiracy theory makes out that the clique or secret society which interested itself in the conspiracy identified the Dewan and the Government with Mr. Abbas Khan, with the object of supplanting the present administration and subverting the constitution if possible. Such statements were made mostly *in camera* in the shape of assertions. Some of the witnesses undertook to furnish documentary and other evidence but, though every opportunity was given to them, failed to produce any. A few witnesses again stated that the clique or secret society consisted of about half-a-dozen members, while one prominent witness said that the whole Progressive Party consisting of nearly a hundred members was involved. We do not think there was any serious attempt to supplant the present Dewan and there was certainly none to overthrow the constitution. No party in Mysore can regard such a feat as a practical possibility.

CHAPTER IX.

Attitude and action of Government Departments and Officers.

88. The Departments chiefly concerned in these disturbances were the Education, the Police, the Magistracy (Judicial) and the Military. We will first take into consideration the attitude of the Director of Public Instruction who is the head of the Department of Education.

Director of Public Instruction.

89. This officer visited the Sultanpet A.-V. School on 15th June and gave orders that the image which was in a corner room should not be restored to the niche until further instructions. He did not then think that this would lead to any agitation or other untoward consequences. Later on, on 21st July, he left Bangalore on tour and did not return till noon on 29th July on which date the image was restored. The Government had decided on the 27th July to restore the image and in order to give effect to their decision they had sent a telegram to the Director of Public Instruction asking him to return immediately. The boys' strike was not taken too seriously at first by the officers of the department or by the Director of Public Instruction himself, and perhaps also there might have been a secret disinclination not to yield to pressure from the boys or their leaders or to the agitation in the Press. Anyhow, at a time when there was violent Press agitation going on, he was slow in coming to a decision. The delay may be due to the fact that he did not keep himself correctly informed of the agitation in progress, or that he made light of the matter and anticipated no serious developments.

The Military Department.

90. A question has been raised whether it was at all necessary to call in the Military. As the Police force was inadequate and the mob is said to have numbered 5,000 to 10,000 persons at one time, we consider the calling in of the Military was really necessary.

The aid of the Military was requisitioned on the 30th and 31st July. On the former date the Chief Commandant was present at the Public Offices for consultation but the troops were handled by subordinate officers. The behaviour of the troops has been much animadverted upon on account of the rough way in which the *sowars* handled the crowds, particularly the boys. Had the crowds dispersed in a peaceful way, nothing untoward would have happened. But the boys showed fight and pelted the *sowars* with stones. Some of the *sowars* seem to have lost their temper at this and chased the boys and even threatened to lance them. Some few boys were actually injured.

Fifty *sowars* were also injured and three of them seriously. A large number of horses are stated to have been new and they took fright and became restive when stones were flung at them. In all these skirmishes between the boys and the *sowars*, one thing to which objection has been taken is that there was no Magistrate to direct the *sowars* in the act of dispersing the crowd at each of the several scenes of action. The order at the Public Offices seems to have been given by the General Secretary to Government. The officers who commanded the several squadrons were evidently not conversant with the codal and other rules applicable to such situations. Barring these, there is nothing to be said against the Military. The *sowars* near the Central Jail maintained their patience and steadiness in spite of the rude behaviour of the students who smothered them with showers of stones.

91. The District Magistrate called in the Military and gave the initial order for the crowd to disperse at Carlton House and was in touch with all the subsequent arrangements. It must also be remembered that the several centres or scenes of action where the Military operated were fairly contiguous, one leading into another. As he was moving freely throughout the day and as the areas were under his personal observation, the operations had his approval. On the whole, the Military rendered considerable service because they dispersed the mob at the Public Offices and other places and restored order near the Sultanpet A. V. School, and in the City generally, immediately after the riot on the night of 30th July.

The District Magistrate, City Magistrate and Jail Superintendent.

92. The District Magistrate did his routine duties and kept himself busy. He was in touch with the Members of Government in charge of the Police and Judicial portfolios and with the officers of other Departments concerned. He was present at the scene of the Sultanpet riot immediately after the event. Up to the 29th July inclusive, he was in touch with the boys' strike. He visited the Sultanpet A. V. School twice and when matters came to a head, he ordered proceedings to be taken against the three leaders on the 27th July. Their arrests were actually effected on the 29th July, though we think action might have been taken earlier. On the 30th July also he was present at Carlton House and at the Public Offices and was moving in all the centres of disturbances throughout the day. At night he arrived at the Sultanpet A. V. School along with the Inspector-General of Police and other officers, as stated already, a few minutes after the rioting. He seems to have arranged, or acquiesced in the arrangements made, that the District Superintendent of Police should look after the Mussalman crowd and the Assistant Superintendent of Police the Hindu crowd. These crowds had ranged themselves on opposite sides of Mr. Abbas Khan's house immediately after the riot.

The District Magistrate according to law was the officer responsible to control the operations in such an emergency. The reason given by him that it was not he but the Inspector-General of Police when he was present that was responsible is not convincing. He did not think it right or prudent to make any house searches or arrests on the 30th night in spite of the clamour of the crowd and the appeals of some of their leaders. The reason assigned by him is that he heard conflicting stories of what had happened and could not place implicit trust in any of them and make up his mind. After the arrival of the *sowars*, he had enough force to use, if he was so minded, in case he encountered any difficulties or obstruction in house searches or in making arrests. Whether he believed the allegations or not, he should have taken immediate steps to verify the versions brought to his notice on the spot, leaving his decisions and further action for the following day.

93. *The City Magistrate.*—The City Magistrate who was in immediate charge of the jurisdiction played no

important part. He should have bestirred himself a little more and been present at the various scenes of conflict at a time when he knew that there was public excitement and commotion. He released the prisoners on the strength of a Government order conveyed to him orally by a private citizen. Since the order was not his own, he should not have acted on the word of a private gentleman however high the latter's position may be. In any case he should have taken steps to see that the crowds dispersed after the release of the prisoners, or at all events he should have telephoned to or communicated with the police in some way to enable them to keep track of the processions.

94. *The Jail Superintendent.*—We have no fault to find with the Superintendent of the Central Jail. His attitude and action were praiseworthy as he kept the crowds well in check.

The Police Department.

95. The Department which had the greatest concern with the disturbances and responsibility for keeping order was the Police. Up to the 29th July inclusive, the police did not interfere with the boys but only kept a benevolent watch over them. The Inspector-General of Police and the Deputy Commissioner asked their officers not to harass the boys unnecessarily. In support of their action they rely on the instructions contained in Government Letter No. 697—C. B., dated the 7th August 1921. The Committee, however, do not consider that this letter of Government lays down any general policy applicable to all such occasions.

The Deputy Commissioner and Inspector-General of Police consulted each other and took action regarding the arrest of the three leaders. It is stated that the police should have taken note of the rowdyism of the boys since it went beyond reasonable limits and actually provoked the Mussalmans. Some action might have been taken in this respect, particularly when traffic was obstructed on the main road opposite the Sultanpet A. V. School or when stones were thrown at school buildings.

On the 30th July, the Inspector-General of Police was watching the disorders throughout the day. He was present at Carlton House and the Public Offices and was in close touch with Government. He took active measures

to distribute his forces as far as available for duty throughout the City, but the arrangements made for intercommunication between the various Police Stations and the scenes of disturbances were not particularly effective and did not prevent boys congregating in large crowds at unexpected centres.

The Inspector-General of Police and the District Magistrate did not anticipate that the leaders would go in procession through the City to the Sultanpet A. V. School, as they had been assured by two prominent citizens that the leaders promised not to go to the School and that they actually went in a different direction with a view to disperse after holding a meeting at the Dharmambudi Tank. The Police officials who noticed the processions at the Yelahanka Gate and through the City should have warned the higher police officers that precautions were necessary near the Sultanpet School to avert possible trouble.

96. There was no co-operation between the District Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police. Their previous relations had not been cordial. The District Superintendent of Police thought that he was not responsible for maintaining law and order in the City and that as the Assistant Superintendent of Police was in direct charge it was that officer's responsibility. Both these officers were disinclined to act without orders from higher officers.

Coming to the incidents of the 30th July night, none of these three officers was present when the riot actually took place. They all arrived towards the close of the riot and almost simultaneously with the appearance of the *sowars*. The firing of the shots had unnerved the Hindu crowd. The portion of the street directly in front of Mr. Abbas Khan's house was cleared by this time, but not the portion at either end. The Inspector-General of Police inadvertently got mixed up in the Mussalman crowd and being discovered to be a Hindu was attacked with *lathis* by some Muslim rowdies who, he stated, were at that time drunk and disorderly. He was disabled and stunned by the attack and had to leave in a car to get his wounds dressed. It seems extraordinary that he should have got into such a crowd or been moving about on such an occasion without his uniform or without any attendant. The attack on the

Inspector-General of Police and his departure were not noticed at the time by the District Magistrate or the District Superintendent of Police or the Assistant Superintendent. These three officers came to some understanding between themselves to maintain order for the rest of the night.

97. The Inspector-General of Police has stated in his evidence that all the efforts of the District Magistrate and of the Police officers were required to maintain order on the 30th July night, and that since it might have led to bloodshed it would have been madness on their part to make any arrests. As this officer left the spot, being himself disabled, this explanation does not account for the omission to act on the 30th night. The District Magistrate, the District Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, who continued to be present after the riot, do not say they had any such apprehensions.

Next morning, in the house of the Dewan and in his presence and that of several heads of Departments and leaders from the City, a decision was come to that the investigation of the crimes and incidents should be entrusted to a Special Magistrate. This decision was confirmed orally the same morning by the Second Member of Council at a meeting at the City Market Station in the presence of the Inspector-General of Police and the District Magistrate. After this, the police considered that they had no further responsibility in the matter. They made no effort to collect any information because they thought it might be construed as an independent parallel enquiry.

We consider that the District Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police were unwilling to act or to take any responsibility whatever on the night of the 30th July. The fact that there were many Mussalmans in the Police force might also be a reason for the officers of the force not taking prompt action. Neither the Inspector-General of Police nor the Deputy Commissioner took control of the situation although they were in close touch with each other and with the Members of Government. They did not give any clear instructions as to the line of action the subordinate officers should take to ensure prompt investigation to bring offenders to justice. The Inspector-General of Police

should have taken control of the situation and acted with greater decision in such an emergency, if necessary after applying to, and obtaining clear instructions from, Government, on the general policy to be followed.

98. The fact remains that all the officers responsible for taking resolute action in that emergency were indisposed to act. The Inspector-General of Police and the District Magistrate have stated that on a previous occasion during the Mill riots in Bangalore a Police officer, who acted boldly and fired on the crowd, was found fault with for indiscretion, and suggested that that event might have influenced these officers. On the whole, we cannot agree that the Police and the Magistracy discharged their obligations or duties on that night. It was a difficult situation, we admit. They could have taken all steps necessary to find out the truth on the spot at the time, since after the Military arrived there was no danger of an extension of the disturbances. It was incumbent on them to collect information on the spot so as to be able to take action, if not on that night, at least at the earliest possible moment. But nobody seemed inclined to act. The whole force was paralysed. It is this aspect of their attitude that calls for special notice. At the same time it must be remarked that they were almost in hourly touch with the Members of Government. Neither at that time nor on the following morning did Government find fault with these officers for not acting, nor was any explanation for their inaction called for on any subsequent date.

CHAPTER X.

ACTION FOR THE FUTURE.

99. We will now briefly set forth our recommendations in regard to the practical measures which, in our opinion, should be immediately taken to restore normal conditions and harmony in the civic life of Bangalore and the State generally.

Detection and Prosecution of offenders.

100. It is understood the Additional District Magistrate appointed by Government is taking necessary action against persons who took part in the riot of the night of 30th July.

The principal offenders are:—

(1) Persons who fired on the crowd or to frighten the crowd;
(2) Persons who are said to have emerged from Mr. Abbas Khan's house and adjacent lanes and committed assaults on the Hindu crowd; and
(3) All other persons of either community who resorted to physical violence either on the 30th July or during any part of these disturbances.

101. It is likely that much of the evidence which might have been available is not now forthcoming on account of the delay that has occurred in the investigations. Yet a special and a further effort should be made to see that every one who used physical violence or offended against the law at whatever period of these disturbances, and against whom evidence may be forthcoming, is arrested and tried according to law. The allegations that boys were dragged in and that four of them were afterwards found lying, face downwards, under suspicious circumstances on the top floor of Mr. Abbas Khan's house require further investigation and closer scrutiny before the question can be finally set at rest. We have made all needful enquiries ourselves into this matter within the time and means at our disposal, but we have not been able to trace any reliable information in support of the allegations so far. A special detective agency should, however, be

employed and suitable rewards offered to induce persons who were within the house on that night or who possess any true inner knowledge of the circumstances to come forward to give information. The allegations may be due to the hallucination of a few individuals and there may be nothing in them at all, but a thorough investigation by an impartial agency is necessary to satisfy the public mind and restore confidence.

Special Courts.

102. For the trial of all the cases connected with these disturbances more courts should be appointed presided over by the senior officers of the Judicial Department, with a definite understanding that all the cases should be disposed of within two to three months so that the existing tension in the public mind may not be unnecessarily prolonged. The number of courts now trying such cases might be increased as required to ensure expeditious disposal to meet this recommendation.

Reforms in the Police Department.

103. As the police force did not function satisfactorily in the disturbances, we enquired at some length into the present condition of the force as regards its personnel and discipline. Both the Inspector-General of Police and the District Magistrate brought to our notice that the force, as at present constituted, was inadequate for the needs of the city. The number of the constables in relation to the population of the city is one policeman for every 336 persons while in the neighbouring Civil and Military Station the corresponding provision is one for every 216 persons. Other essential differences between the two forces are that the City Police are given comparatively very low pay and they are not housed at the cost of Government. The salary of an average policeman in the City is three-fifths of that paid to his confrère in the Civil and Military Station. The City Police not being housed in Government buildings and being scattered all over the City are not available for service at short notice.

There is no special City Police trained as such for dealing with an urban population. The officer in charge of the Police force of the City holds the rank of an Assistant Superintendent of Police. His rank in our view should be that of a Superintendent of Police.

The present C. I. D. staff is of poor calibre and miserably paid. The staff should be strengthened on the lines of the corresponding force in British India. The officers of the Police Department are at present also drawn from the cadre of the State Civil Service and they join the force without previous technical training. It is suggested that in future only officers with special aptitudes and qualifications should be drafted to the police force, and they should receive the requisite degree of technical training before they are actually employed on police duty.

104. The Inspector-General of Police (Mr. S. Hiriyannaiya) has made some suggestions for the improvement of the C. I. D. section of the Police Department. The District Magistrate (Mr. G. B. Heblikar) has prepared, at our request, proposals for the improvement of the City Police. We have no wish to go into the details of these proposals, but we consider that a case has been made out for the reorganization of the City Police to enable it to cope with similar situations with success in future. We consider that all officers and men should be trained in the use of fire-arms and all inspectors and sub-inspectors should be supplied with revolvers. It may also be desirable to maintain a dozen or two mounted police in the Bangalore City force. Special hand-books giving minute instructions regarding all branches of duty in the Police service should be supplied both to officers and men.

There may be other developments necessary to improve the efficiency of the Police force. A special reorganization scheme may be drawn up by deputing a qualified officer for the purpose, after studying the conditions of the police in cities like Bombay and Calcutta and, if possible, also London.

105. There are one or two other points to which we wish to invite special attention. The police force at present contains 61 per cent Hindus and 34 per cent Mussalmans (*vide* Appendix iv). The officers also come from both communities. This mixed composition makes the force undependable in emergencies when communal quarrels are involved. This aspect of the matter should receive special consideration and suitable remedies devised. Improved discipline should be an essential feature.

106. It has come to our notice that there is a free movement of habitual criminals and gangs between the Bangalore City, Bangalore Taluk and the Civil and Military Station. During the disturbances of the 30th July large numbers of Mussalmans estimated at 300 to 500, some of them armed with *lathis*, invaded the City and struck terror among the City population while marching through the streets. It is suggested that an understanding should be reached with the Cantonment Police that such gangs should be effectively prevented from leaving the Civil and Military Station in times of commotion. The City Police should be able to reciprocate when required. We learn that the officers of the Cantonment Police did co-operate on the last occasion and we only suggest here that there should be a special understanding in this respect for future emergencies.

ACTION IN OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

Military.

107. In times of disturbances all the available Magistrates should be mobilised for service and posted in the disturbed areas to guide the Police (and the Military when the latter are also employed) and control operations generally so that order may be preserved with the minimum use of physical force. The officers of the Military force entrusted with the command of detached units should be conversant with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code pertaining to such occasions so that they may act in times of commotion strictly according to law.

As regards the composition of the Military force, it is stated that its organisation was fixed a long time ago. If that is so, it would be well to examine the original order with an eye to its suitability to present day conditions. In this respect the same remarks as in the case of the Police force apply to the Military also. Some special precautions will be necessary in the employment of Military in times of communal disturbances, so that the force employed might not show special sympathy or antipathy towards any particular section of citizens on such occasions.

Review of Miller Committee Proposals.

108. The Government Order on the Miller Committee proposals issued in the year 1921 was referred to by several important witnesses. As a result of this order, some

benefit has accrued to Non-Brahmins but much agitation and communal ill-will have been created between Brahmins and Non-Brahmins and, latterly, between some sections of the Non-Brahmins themselves, according as one or the other communities obtained more than their fair share of Government appointments. The proposals have proved an apple of discord.

In the course of the operation of the Order, all the educated Non-Brahmins have made common cause to oppose the preponderance of the Brahmin element in the Public Service. The Brahmin community owe their ascendency in official life to their culture and past traditions. The percentage of literacy among Brahmins is 46·1 against 7 per cent among all classes (Appendix iii). The Brahmins, who on this account were earning their livelihood from official and clerical appointments, now find their normal occupations partly gone. The Non-Brahmin communities who did not formerly prepare themselves for Government appointments are now doing so and they are anxious to obtain their fair share. Such appointments give them power and social position which they lacked before and which they now rightly covet. It must be stated that the subordinate services in all the offices were hitherto staffed to a disproportionate extent by the Brahmin community. The main reason of the paucity of Non-Brahmins in Government service was their lack of education of the standard specially required for the services. They were till recently content to follow their own traditional occupations. Fifty years ago, for instance, a merchant in Bangalore would give scholarships to a Brahmin lad rather than to a boy of his own community.

109. Some arrangements should be devised under which all classes should have their fair share of Government appointments, and merit and industry must at the same time be the sole tests for employment as in every civilized country. The Non-Brahmin communities should be induced to qualify themselves in larger numbers by increasing their education and the State should give special facilities for such increase. At the same time, the Brahmin community should be given facilities to qualify for other occupations. The State as a whole will lose ground if it discouraged education and culture as passports to Government service. An understanding is necessary

to rapidly improve the proportion of Non-Brahmins in the public services in a manner consistent with these conditions. Qualification and merit should be the main test for appointment and no one should be appointed because of his religion or community.

On account of the bitterness and jealousies roused by the Miller Committee order, the feelings of the two communities are estranged. Neither party is altogether in the right or wholly in the wrong. We cannot go into this question more fully without our object being misunderstood. But the present quarrels between the two communities bode no good for the prosperity of the State. We would suggest that the questions arising from the order should be fully discussed at a round table conference, or otherwise, by the leaders of both the communities, with a view to arriving at a settlement consistent with international practices and fair play. It will be easy for Government to endorse such an understanding.

A Press Advisory Board.

110. We have already indicated the nature of the excesses committed by the Press in recent months in Bangalore. A number of newspapers have been started within the past two years and some of them have of late unfortunately developed disrespect for authority and a violent tone. Since only 7 per cent of the population of the State (Appendix iii) is literate, the effect of such papers on the public mind is not healthy. In some cases, as in the present disturbances, the vernacular Press is consciously or unconsciously responsible for inciting communal hatred and jealousies in the mofussil. It is now suggested that a Board consisting of about five persons, with an official Secretary, be created in the State on which public men and journalists may sit. Their duty should be to watch the writings in the press in the whole State and to issue a bulletin once a month reviewing in a small leaflet the operations of the Press during the month. The bulletins may notice the tone of any paper which may be exceeding the limits of journalistic propriety. In the case of any particular journal, after two or three such notices the Board might recommend to Government to take punitive action according to law.

One or two good daily newspapers of the type of

those published in Bombay or Madras are a real need, and the starting of such papers deserves every encouragement and support at the hands of Government until one or two are established.

Hindu-Muslim harmony.

111. Whatever may have been the case when the riot was still fresh in the minds of the people, there is really no communal tension between Hindus and Mussalmans at the present time and there was none even before the riot. The leaders of both communities have testified to this fact. Mr. Abbas Khan was elected President of the Bangalore City Municipal Council mainly by a majority of Hindu votes. The present Administration has been known to be impartial in supporting religious places of worship of both communities. We do not, therefore, think any special measures are necessary to restore good feeling between the two communities. One direction in which a move is called for is to promote habits of social and business intercourse between the different communities more and more on international lines. This cannot be done in a day and the measures of a permanent nature needed for this purpose will be referred to again in the concluding chapter.

The Students.

112. The question of the discipline of the students has been referred by Government to a separate Committee. The only suggestion that occurs to us in this connection is that some kind of instruction in Civics is necessary so as to make the future generation grow up into useful citizens. This question, as well as that of unemployment to which some prominent witnesses have drawn our attention, do not come in the category of matters requiring the immediate attention of Government. The unrest, it is said, is chiefly due to the fact that conditions have changed from what they were before the War and while education and intelligence have developed, occupations and careers for securing a living have contracted. Both on the question of training of the students and on the unemployment problem we reserve our observations to the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER XI.

Summary of Findings.

113. In Government Order No. 1042—C. B. 38-28-114, dated 28th August 1928 (Appendix i), four terms of reference in all are given to us for investigation and report. The root causes and course of events that led to the disturbances (Term of Reference No. 1) and the special causes or influences, if any, which were at work at the time and which led to such unusual events (Term of Reference No. 2) are both explained in Chapter VIII. The steps taken by the local officers to cope with the situation (Term of Reference No. 3) are dealt with in Chapter IX. The measures required to remove misunderstandings and restore good feeling and harmony among the various communities concerned (Term of Reference No. 4) are given in Chapter X. The three preceding Chapters, namely, VIII to X therefore deal seriatim with all the four terms of reference. As any separate answers to the terms of reference would mean a categorical repetition of what has been already stated, we will not attempt a recapitulation. But in a case so complicated as this, it will perhaps be an advantage to pick out the issues that really matter and give a resumé of the findings in regard to them. This we shall attempt in the succeeding paragraphs.

114. The origin of the disturbances was due to the initial mistake made in allowing the contractor to build a niche for the Ganesha image without the sanction of either of the Departments of Government concerned. As a niche was constructed and the importance of the image as a religious emblem was thereby enhanced, the order for the non-restoration of the image pending enquiry may be said to be fully justified. The dissatisfaction of the boys at the non-restoration was also natural and it gained impetus when they received encouragement and guidance from certain leaders, from the local press and eventually from the Hindu population of the City generally. It would have been possible to end the situation at any stage, had the Departmental officers realised the seriousness of allowing delays to occur in a religious and communal

dispute of this character. The Education Department took time to consider the point and delayed the restoration. One step led to another and, although each in itself was not wholly illogical or unreasonable, their cumulative effect was disastrous.

The conspiracy theory advanced has been carefully examined by us and we find it cannot survive a serious analysis. Mr. Abbas Khan who was the central figure in these disturbances put forward the theory after the riot. There were perhaps individual agitators who wrote anonymous communications and spread false or exaggerated rumours secretly and whose misdeeds would come within the purview of the law courts if sufficient evidence were forthcoming. But the acts of such individuals have had no support from any large part of the population. We have so far not seen any documentary or other clear evidence, except some articles in a few newspapers, of an attempt to overthrow the Government. The conspiracy theory identifies the fortunes of Mr. Abbas Khan with those of the Dewan and the Government. There has been dissatisfaction against certain policies of the Dewan and perhaps also among a few fanatical Hindus against the city improvements but there was no deeply thought-out purpose, no serious organization to see him removed from office. As far as we are aware, there was never any opposition to him as Dewan on account of his creed or religion. Neither could the criticisms in the Press against him or against Government, though in some respects unpatriotic and irritating, be construed as a conspiracy.

The students and the Press.

115. The students may have had reasons to be dissatisfied at first on account of the non-restoration of the image. But their subsequent action was guided by mob leaders and other maturer minds from whom they received bad advice. There was no justification for their invasion of the Schools and Colleges, the Central Jail, Carlton House, or the Public Offices, or for the acts of rowdyism which they committed at all or most of these places, and their conduct in pelting stones at the *sowars* was reprehensible.

It is understood that Government have appointed a separate Committee to enquire into the measures necessary to restore discipline among the student population.

Many of the acts of the boys were inspired by youthful enthusiasm and indiscretion and there is no use in taking too serious a view of their behaviour. The Police officers were not wrong in being lenient and humane, at any rate in the initial stages. But there should be a limit to such tolerance. Similar outbursts in future should be carefully guarded against and the slightest transgressions of the law swiftly noticed and checked.

The Press requires some kind of regulation which could be best undertaken by a purely non-official Advisory Board. In the present circumstances of the country and the feeble state of public opinion, excesses on the part of individual papers are quite likely. Such excesses should be swiftly investigated and action promptly taken. The Board proposed will be able to guide the Press by the issue of bulletins and timely recommendations to Government when any action on the part of the latter is called for.

Riot of 30th July.

116. Coming to the riot of 30th July, which is the most important event in the disturbances, we are convinced that shooting did take place. The majority of the Committee Members think that shots came from both the cycle shop as well as from opposite the school. We also believe that a number of Mussalmans holding *lathis* came out of Mr. Abbas Khan's compound immediately after the firing of the shots and attacked the Hindu crowd, which was unarmed at the time, driving the people right and left. These Mussalmans first cleared the crowd in front of Mr. Abbas Khan's house, then entered the school premises opposite the house, overturned the Ganesha image and committed other atrocities. Simultaneously, batches of other Mussalmans also armed with *lathis* emerged from the houses and side lanes surrounding the mosque.

There have been allegations of graver crimes, namely, that boys were dragged into Mr. Abbas Khan's house and murdered, and that a dead body was found next morning at the entrance to the school premises just opposite his house. But these have not been borne out by any evidence. Every complaint that was received in this connection was closely examined. Our inference, so far, is that no one is found missing and no death under such circumstances could have been concealed. As traces of the happenings of the 30th July night have been almost

obliterated owing to the delay in the investigations, we have thought it right to recommend further special enquiry into this matter to remove all traces of suspicion in the public mind.

The Hindus upon whom the attack came as a surprise speedily prepared themselves for retaliation, but they were stopped by the appearance of the Military and the Reserve Police force. The Military also prevented danger to the City from the Mussalmans, reported to be between 300 and 500, who came from the Civil and Military Station, presumably to avenge the wrongs perpetrated on their co-religionists, of which rumours had reached them. But for the timely arrival of the Military, there was grave danger of a deadly conflict arising between the two communities attended by extensive loss of life.

Delays in investigating crimes. Government Communiques.

117. The situation which arose with the outburst on the 30th July night was not handled in the manner that was to be expected from custodians of law and order. There were no investigations, no house searches, no arrests, although shots were fired and over 60 men, including 6 Hindu members of the Police force, were injured at the hands of Mussalmans armed with *lathis*.

The next morning Government took the investigation out of the hands of the Police with a view to entrust it to a Magistrate. The Police, if they had any interest in the case, lost it altogether. The officer who began the investigation was not promptly relieved of his routine duties, and four days later he was replaced by another more senior officer. By these changes and acts of omission and commission, much of the evidence which would have revealed the true character of the occurrences was lost. The Government communiques, too, as already explained, were vague and also inaccurate in some important respects.

Government Departments and Officers.

118. The Government in the Education Department might have taken a more serious view of the case and acted more promptly than it did, in view of the religious and communal aspects of the agitation.

The Military force called to keep order and disperse the crowds on the 30th July was commanded by junior

officers who were not conversant with the law or rules applicable to such situations. The Lancers treated the boys rather rudely but the behaviour of the boys and the crowd towards them was no less rude. The former were not guided by the civil authorities in the act of dispersing the crowd. On the whole, no particular fault can be found with the Military. The Lancers showed patience and steadiness, and stood their ground at a time when great confusion and excitement prevailed. They really saved the situation.

119. The principal responsibility for anything that went wrong on the 30th July in enforcing law and order must rest with the Police and the Magistracy.

The arrangements made by them to meet the situation on the 30th July, which they must have anticipated, seem to us to have been wholly inadequate. There was no organization worth mentioning, no plan of operations, no concerted action on their part. There were no arrangements for keeping themselves informed by any effective means of communication except by meeting each other. Subordinate magistrates, of whom there were quite a number in the City, were not called in and posted, as they should have been, to guide the Military and control the crowd at the various centres of disturbance.

None of the principal officers was present at the time of the riot. They took no steps to investigate crimes, or institute house searches or make arrests immediately after the riot. They could not identify a single offender even though 45 injured men were admitted into the Hospital after the riot.

120. Mr. Abbas Khan has long been in the forefront of political leaders in Mysore. He was President of the Bangalore City Municipality and did valuable work in connection with the City improvement schemes. There seemed a disinclination on the part of the Police officers to take any action which might have cast a slur on him. This may be seen in the lack of action when disturbances occurred at and near Mr. Abbas Khan's house. The District Magistrate, the Inspector-General of Police and other senior officers were all there immediately after the riot; they heard all the reports and rumours, but did

nothing. Whether it was that they were afraid to move in the case of such an influential public man or what other motives there were, has not been made clear.

So far as the evidence adduced before us goes, there is nothing to indicate that the Police and the Magistracy acted or failed to act by reason of any orders from Government. It is unfortunate that at no stage, either before or after the riot, did Government ask for or obtain any reports or explanations of the occurrences, which in the usual course of official routine should have been furnished. When the riot took place and hundreds of people heard the firing of shots, the Government were led to believe by their informants that there was no firing. For a considerable time after the rioting, no house searches or arrests were made. The Police were anxious not to get mixed up; they were loath to take any initiative at all. It is this attitude of indifference or inaction which prevailed from top to bottom in the Department that has justly roused public indignation. The only inference permitted to us in these circumstances is that the officers chiefly concerned with these disturbances failed to discharge their legitimate duties for reasons best known to themselves.

Public suspicion and dissatisfaction.

121. These acts of omission and commission have roused the indignation of the Hindu community who form about 88 per cent. of the City population. The dissatisfaction has spread also to the different parts of the State. There are no permanent Hindu-Moslem differences as such, but some of the Hindus feel that in this particular case the Government should not have interfered in a religious matter at the instance of a leader belonging to a different religion. They also feel that after the Hindus were attacked by a Mussalman mob, there was distinct disinclination on the part of Government officers to take any action to bring the offenders to account.

122. The main thing to be kept in view, in the measures to be taken immediately, is to conduct an investigation into the criminal offences which are yet undetected by a special trustworthy agency and to punish all the offenders. It is for this reason that prosecution before special courts and disposal of the cases within two

or three months is recommended. The Committee feel that the present unhealthy atmosphere should be ended as speedily as possible.

123. The irregularities and omissions here mentioned have caused much dissatisfaction and led to extensive comments in the Press. The evidence which has come before us can lead only to one conclusion. It is not as if the disturbances which occurred could not have been prevented or, when they did occur, prompt measures could not have been taken to restore public confidence. To accept such a view would be tantamount to assuming that the incidents were inevitable and no one could be held responsible for them. A large number of persons received wounds and bruises on the 30th July; but, so far as we have been able to ascertain, there have been no deaths. Save in the case of three or four persons, the injuries inflicted were not serious. On the whole, the incidents connected with the disturbances were in themselves comparatively unimportant. It was the breakdown of the Government machinery on the occasion that has created real apprehension and provoked just criticism.

CHAPTER XII.

Deeper Causes–Wider Issues-Conclusion.

124. We have now dealt with practically all the various aspects of the disturbances which came within the scope of our terms of reference. The disturbances have deeply stirred the feelings of the citizens of Bangalore. The causes, as many responsible witnesses have testified, are many and complex. They include communal, religious, political, even economic, considerations. Some are direct, some indirect; some are temporary, others of a permanent nature. Our report has so far taken account of the causes both direct and indirect, but in speaking of remedies, we have confined our attention to measures of immediate practical importance. Since Government have drawn the Committee's attention to the root causes, we feel we will not be fulfilling all that is expected of us, did we fail to refer, even superficially, to the wider issues which they raise and the more permanent solutions which they call for.

The outburst of the 30th July was both a portent and a premonition. It has indicated the existence of deeper causes and pent-up forces. The remedies we have suggested in what follows are not intended for the immediate consideration of Government but they should be taken into account in shaping future State policies. It is incumbent on Government to watch the trend of political and economic movements both within and outside the State and adjust its measures accordingly.

Our colleague, Mr. Ralph Nye, is unwilling to subscribe to the views contained in this Chapter with which he does not agree.

Influence of Political Movements in British India.

125. On account of the facilities of rapid communication and interchange of thought, the people of the State are easily affected by political movements in British India.

Bardoli Satyagraha.

The strike and the *satyagraha* of the boys of the Sultanpet School here were but a reflex of the *satyagraha* which was in progress on a larger scale in the Bardoli Taluka of the Bombay Presidency during the whole of the time the students' agitation was carried on in Bangalore. We believe the leaders and supporters of the students, if not the students themselves, were influenced to some extent by the agitation which was going on simultaneously on the Bombay side. As a matter of fact, the dispute between the Government of Bombay and the people of the Bardoli Taluka was settled by mutual agreement a week after the Bangalore disorders culminated in the riot of the night of 30th July.

Hindu-Moslem Differences.

126. Again, since the adoption of communal electorates for the Central and Provincial Legislatures in British India, an acute competition has arisen and bitter jealousies have been roused between Hindus and Mussalmans resulting in some cases in fanatical outbursts. The Mussalmans, who formerly were tolerant to the customs of the preponderatingly Hindu population among whom they lived, have in recent years been showing a tendency to stand apart. It is, we believe, a reflex of that feeling that precipitated the communal quarrel in Bangalore. Whenever differences arose, the Hindu population usually expressed its feelings through the Press and occasionally in public speeches but the Mussalmans resorted to physical violence. The relations between the two communities in British India have become strained in this way in recent years.

Disputes over Appointments to Public Service.

127. The Brahmin and Non-Brahmin controversy in Mysore also originated from a similar phenomenon which had begun in the Madras Presidency. The Miller Committee Report whose aim was to increase the Non-Brahmin element in the public service has accentuated differences, roused jealousies and hatreds which, unless the good sense of the two communities asserts itself, will take long to root out. For centuries the communities have lived in peace. As suggested in paragraph 109 above, it should be possible by means of a round table conference for the two communities, including the Mussalmans, to arrive at a reasonable compromise and help to restore their old brotherly trust and amity.

Agitation for Responsible Government in Mysore.

128. Then again, the politically-minded public in Mysore are conscious of the fact that while the British Provinces which have already got the dyarchical system are putting forward a demand for the Dominion form of Government, their own system is even behind dyarchy. There is an agitation therefore for a fuller and truer form of responsible Government in Mysore. It is true that the association between the Government and the people in Mysore is closer than in British India and the public have great confidence in, and entertain feelings of loyalty and respect to, the person of the Ruler of the State. Nevertheless, the demand for political privileges has been insistent and is bound to increase.

Problems Awaiting Permanent Solution.

129. All this discontent and the resulting opposition to Government policies and measures, have been influenced by similar activities in British India. The problems which arise in these circumstances have to be faced and solutions of a more or less permanent character found for them. These problems may be classed under three main heads, namely:—

(i) How to heal communal differences,
(ii) How to relieve unemployment, and
(iii) How to allay political discontent.

Under each of these, we shall offer a few suggestions before concluding this report. It will be understood that in the short space at our disposal we can but touch the fringe of these problems.

How to Heal Communal Differences.

130. Wherever diversity of habits and practices exists, it is a fruitful source of ill-feeling and distrust. That is why in this State, as elsewhere in India, people have been unable to co-operate effectively for nation-building activities. Differences of religious creeds, languages, manners, customs and habits have long existed in this State and there have been no counteracting influences at work to promote union and harmony. They have come to be regarded as a permanent factor, more or less, in the civic life of the country. The prevailing jealousies and

hatreds, recently introduced by the Miller Committee Report and by communal electorates, can only be effaced by a sustained voluntary effort in that behalf on the part of the two sections of the population concerned, under the stimulus of patriotism and public interest.

131. A permanent remedy for this state of things is to attempt to standardise the habits and practices of the people. Turkey began this reform a few years ago and Afghanistan is attempting the same to-day. A short time ago, the Government and the people of the United States of America made a special effort to standardise habits and practices among the heterogeneous races who went there from Europe. This greatly helped not only the prospects of the individual immigrants but also the prosperity of the States as a whole. Standards, when established, will facilitate business, promote social intercourse, create good understanding and mutual trust, and cheapen the cost of necessaries and amenities for all. Standards for business life will mean regular hours and understandings in connection with daily business, efficiency in methods of work, economy of time, correct views as to self-support and home-keeping, successful living and intelligent citizenship.

132. Sound standards will not grow of themselves, but have to be brought into existence by education and propaganda. Instruction in standards should be based on the fundamental needs of moral discipline and business efficiency. Young persons should be taught, in schools, standards to include business discipline and the obligations and duties of citizenship as well as its rights and privileges. Adults should be instructed in the same by lectures and other forms of propaganda and by means of night classes.

A young man when he leaves the school after a course of training, should be clean in speech and habits, with a correct sense of patriotism, loyalty to the Ruler, aptitude for initiative, love of self-help, appreciation of the value of time, respect for law and order and a knowledge of the value of right thinking and right living. He should at the same time be sufficiently well equipped to fall into position in some business or other and be able to support himself.

Community Councils might be brought into existence for towns and groups of villages, with a view to get together representatives of all classes to undertake common tasks for their welfare and to promote common interests and a common consciousness among them all.

How to Relieve Unemployment.

134. A number of prominent witnesses have brought to our notice that the present unrest is largely due to unemployment. As remarked before, education and intelligence have advanced but the occupations of the people remain few and unbalanced. The profession of law is overcrowded. Agriculture, as practised in the country, is still primitive, and for want of organization on a large scale and of scientific and business practices, it fails to attract the educated classes. A movement to advance the industries and trade of the State has been initiated by Government; but, not being backed by its money power, is making slow progress. Organized industries are still in their infancy. What trade there is in the city of Bangalore is passing out of the hands of the local tradesmen into those of merchants from outside who are better organized and who also command capital.

135. The principal measures needed to promote industries are of a two-fold character. The first is technical education and the next is certain concrete aids.

Taking *education* first, we consider that a Faculty of Agriculture should be started in the Mysore University and the old Commerce Faculty should be revived immediately. The Jubilee College of Technology proposed to commemorate the benevolent rule of His Highness the Maharaja should be brought into existence without further loss of time. High and Middle schools should have vocational courses so that the students on leaving those institutions might be qualified to enter at once some profession, occupation or service. An industrial bias should be given to education imparted in elementary schools. This bias should be in favour of agriculture in rural areas. Elementary education should be compulsory and there should be a State-wide organization to abolish illiteracy.

Coming next to *aids to industries*, the first need is leaders, managers and technical experts. It will not be

difficult to find these or to train the requisite number from the educated population of the State. The next need is financial backing. An outlay of 6 to 8 per cent. of the State revenues should be advanced for the next ten years for industrial activities, both governmental and private, if any appreciable results are to be expected in providing employment for the population. Deputations of men prominent in industries and trade should be sent regularly every year to foreign countries by granting them subsidies for the purpose. New industries should be started by Government Departments or with the aid of Consulting Engineers and gradually transferred to joint-stock companies and private business men. Correct statistics should be maintained of the quantities and value of agricultural and industrial output in villages and districts from year to year.

136. The vast majority of adult persons, both men and women, in the State should be brought up as workers and trained to earn an honest living by their own industry. By workers is meant all persons who use their brain or brawn to produce commodities or render services. To this end businesses should be multiplied in agriculture, irrigation, industries, railways, other forms of transport, trade and the professions generally.

Business requires *leaders* and *workers*, and the population of the State, for our present purposes, may be considered as divided into these two classes; *leaders* comprising administrators, managers, financiers, engineers, chemists and other technical experts to be trained in our Universities, and *workers* who form the great bulk of the population to be trained in High, Middle, or Elementary Schools. The education in this latter class of institutions should have an industrial bias.

The strength of the country will lie in the development of its natural resources and in building up industries. Units of business employing *leaders* and large numbers of *workers* should be multiplied, so that there may be occupations according to individual capacity for every one who has a mind to work. Such units are already built up in industrially advanced countries to the fullest extent of their respective needs and capacity. In Mysore the number of such units is small, their efficiency feeble and

the backing they receive from the political and money power of Government negligible. People are not living up to their opportunities. To multiply these business units and maintain them in a high state of efficiency should be the main aim of both the Government and the people in the future. An effective organization for this purpose is the principal need of the hour.

How to Allay Political Discontent.

137. The third or last problem is how to allay political discontent. The contentment of the people will largely depend on their having sufficient occupations and enjoying a fair measure of material prosperity. Their future hope therefore lies in increasing the output from industries and agriculture and promoting business. If they are fully occupied in earning money or building up property, they will have no time or inclination to quarrel either with Government or among themselves.

The gross revenue of the State in round figures amounted to Rs. 265 lakhs in 1913-14 before the War and it is estimated at Rs. 356 lakhs in 1928-29. Assuming that the purchasing power of money is now less by at least one-third, the revenue in these 15 years shows, not growth, but decline. This not unnaturally suggests that while the new awakening has raised new ambitions, the material prosperity of the people, through all these vicissitudes, has not advanced. Unsatisfactory economic conditions in Mysore are, however, no new thing; and for these, the present Government can in no way be held responsible. On the contrary it is well known that the present Dewan has been giving special attention to schemes calculated to benefit the economic uplift of the State.

138. In order to promote contentment, either the State should have a Government of the Mussolini type, keeping the people intensely engaged in building up business and property, or a regular Constitutional Monarchy approaching the British model in which the responsibility for the amelioration of the people is thrown for the most part on the people themselves. It will not be possible to maintain the first-named type of Government at a high level of efficiency for any length of time, or to have a Mussolini always at the head of affairs. The

safer and more common alternative is to introduce a party system of Government and divide the politicians representing the constituencies into two classes, such as Conservatives and Progressives, instead of the present classification of Brahmins and Non-Brahmins. The two parties should be so formed as to represent between them as much of the property, experience and culture, as is available in the State as a whole. The Dewan may be retained as Chief Minister, if necessary for a term of years, after the party system comes into use, so that there may be no rash break with traditions.

139. Much of the present unrest is due to lack of sufficient employment for the intelligentsia and to the absence of any responsibility for public welfare on the part of the leaders of the people. Mysore has always been in the forefront of Indian States and it would be in consonance with its past traditions if, instead of drifting with the times, it anticipated what was coming and conferred some measure of responsibility on the people in good time. The attachment to the Ruler will only grow with the introduction of timely beneficent reforms.

140. The World War has changed the outlook of the people in Mysore as in the rest of India and elsewhere. New ideas of self-determination, and of combination among the weak to force concessions from the strong, are spreading and new ambitions have penetrated the public mind. There is an astonishing amount of intelligence and ability among the present day leaders in Mysore, but their training has been one-sided, being mostly for the profession of law, Government service or literary pursuits. The State machinery gives them no scope, no facilities, no inducement to turn their attention to business, to become producers instead of being merely consumers. They also feel that they have no hand in the administration or in the shaping of State policies, the responsibility for which under the present system is centralised, being entrusted to less than half-a-dozen persons. The Miller Committee order has divided the people into communities and interests and the people's energies are now frittered away in attacks on Government or on each other. There is a tendency to throw the responsibility for every mishap on the shoulders of Government. No country whose energies are cramped or misdirected

in this manner has the smallest chance of advancing in prosperity.

Conclusion.

141. The theory of conspiracy mentioned in a previous chapter was set up against a clique or class of persons who were unfriendly to Government and who constantly criticised its acts. If the Government were a despotic monarchy, political opposition of this class might be crushed by arbitrary methods—methods which some local public men have openly suggested—namely, the suppression of newspapers and the deportation of obnoxious politicians. But in this twentieth century, particularly after the War, such methods will not appeal to enlightened public opinion anywhere and cannot be practised with impunity. The acts and sayings attributed to persons alleged to be concerned in a conspiracy, where they have not actually transgressed the law, have to be taken as evidences of political or constitutional opposition. The liberties at present enjoyed by the Press and the people in Mysore are no more than are conceded in British India, and however much we may deplore the excesses committed by some of them, it will not be practicable to restrict their present freedom and liberty, or insist upon a lower standard of relations between the Government and the people than is permitted in the neighbouring British Provinces.

142. "No nation can be perfectly well-governed till it is competent to govern itself"—so said Lord Macaulay nearly a hundred years ago in the British House of Commons while discussing proposals for the future Government of India at that time. The people should be made competent by practice, by being given the necessary opportunity to govern themselves. It must be remembered that the proposals just enumerated pass for commonplaces in Western countries. Even if all the constitutional privileges and all the measures for social and economic uplift suggested in this chapter are forthwith conceded or adopted, the Mysore State will just attain the position which Great Britain had reached more than a century ago, and Japan more than fifty years ago. Possibly Afghanistan, though she came into contact with Western civilization but yesterday, will attain that position sooner than Mysore may do.

143. Nobody benefits by, nobody is better for, the present system. Unless Government shifts some of its responsibility for constructive work on to the shoulders of the people, the weaknesses and evils arising from too much dependence on Government, will not diminish and the people will not be able to utilise to the full the power and material resources of the State to carve out their own destiny. A State-wide awakening will come only with the realization of responsibility. Government, too, will find it increasingly difficult to put down strikes, disorders or acts of rowdyism in future. Without the moral backing of the people, they will find it more and more difficult to carry on even the ordinary work of administration. On the other hand, if the lessons of the disturbances are taken to heart and the remedial measures suggested in this report are vigorously and consistently pursued, they may prove a starting point for the regeneration of Mysore. In this way, out of evil good may come; the disturbances may prove a blessing in disguise.

M. VISVESVARAYA.
D. K. RAMA RAV.
H. G. BASAVAPPA.
GULAM AHMED KALAMI.*
V. MANICKAVELU MUDALIAR.
B. NAGAPPA.
RALPH NYE.

BANGALORE,
15th December 1928.

*Signed subject to my qualifying note. (*Vide page 93.*)

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Minute Recorded by the Committee in forwarding the Qualifying Note of Mr. Gulam Ahmed Kalami.

The members of the Committee, with the exception of Mr. D. K. Rama Rao, who is absent on leave in northern India and Mr. Gulam Ahmed Kalami, the writer of the qualifying note, who was not asked to be present, met on the 22nd January 1929 and recorded the following minute :—

"Mr. Kalami's note may be forwarded to Government.

"2. There are two statements in the opening paragraph of Mr. Kalami's note which cannot be passed over without comment. He complains (1) that he was not given sufficient time to pass the draft Report and (2) that a copy of the draft Report was not given to him to take home.

"3. As regards the first complaint, it may be stated that the last sitting of the Committee was on 12th November and the draft Report was ready for the Press on the 6th December following. The draft was considered in the Committee on the 7th, 8th and 9th December 1928. The Committee, sitting for 8 to 10 hours every day, went over paragraph by paragraph and revised the draft as required.

"When the Report was ready for signature on the 14th December, Mr. Kalami stated that he would sign the Report subject to a qualifying note. He promised to send in his note without fail on the 20th of the month, but, on account of bereavements and other difficulties, he actually sent it on the 15th January 1929, or after the lapse of a month.

"The Committee went over parts of the Report again on the 14th and 15th December and submitted the same to Government on the 17th idem.

"4. As regards the second complaint that Members were not allowed to take copies home, it was thought important to maintain strict secrecy because unusual interest was evinced by the Public in the findings of the Committee and because also some of the evidence taken *in camera* had become public and was being discussed in the Press at that time. When the question was formally considered in Committee and the Chairman asked the Members to pass a vote in favour of taking copies home if they were so inclined, Mr. Kalami's proposal failed to receive support except from Mr. Nagappa and Mr. Basavappa who said they were labouring under the same difficulties."

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QUALIFYING NOTE.

BY MR. GULAM AHMED KALAMI.

It is with extreme regret that I had to sign the Committee's Report, as it eventually emerged, subject to a qualifying note. I had to do so because I could not subscribe to some of the remarks made and conclusions arrived at to support the Committee's recommendations. At the outset, I must state that the Committee was called to discuss and pass the draft Report within a short period of 2 or 3 days, without a copy of it being given to each member beforehand to enable him to come prepared for discussions at the meetings after a careful and detailed study. Without an advanced copy of the draft Report I felt very much handicapped during the discussions, as I know some of my colleagues also were. The only facility afforded to me after my repeated representations was, the promise of a draft copy being sent to my house for my perusal. This was, later on, altered to a permission to read it in the Committee's Office within a limited time of four hours while the Secretary was present, on the day the final draft had to be signed. It was after a hurried reading that I found the necessity to append this qualifying note. In expressing my views in the following paragraphs, I have not departed from the views I expressed in answering a confidential questionnaire that was set by the Chairman at an earlier stage.

To begin with, I feel that the Committee have gone beyond the terms of reference in regard to (1) the shooting affair, (2) the probable offenders connected with that incident, (3) the proposed revision of the Miller Committee Report, and (4) the proposals in Chapter XII relating to constitutional reforms. The terms of reference restrict our opinion to matters relating to root causes and course of events that led to the disturbances, and to special causes or influences, if any, which were at work at the time and which led to such unusual events. I think it is beyond our province to usurp the functions of the Additional District Magistrate and the courts in dealing with the first two points. In this view I am strengthened by some of the counsel who argued that the finding of the

real culprits and their punishment were matters that concerned the properly constituted authorities. A question might arise as to why evidence on these points was let in at all. This was done, as I understood it at the time, to find out whether, during the course of a witness' examination on the points relating to the riot itself, he would disclose something which would throw light on the course of events that led to the disturbances, and whether there were "any special causes or influences at work which led to such unusual events." Still, I think the Committee is not expected to deal with evidence that was not relevant to our enquiry under the terms of reference.

Even if it be admitted that a reference to it was permissible, the evidentiary value of the statements made by a large number of witnesses has to be tested. I think that at a time when there is a great tension between two parties, each will try to exaggerate its version of the case with a view to incriminate its opponents. When evidence given on oath in courts has often lost its sanctity and people perjure themselves, the more the graver the offence, it is no wonder that witnesses appearing before this Committee should make irresponsible and, in some cases, unbelievable statements when they were not examined on oath.

Reference has been made in the Report as to the places from which shots and assailants came, giving room to the public to suspect a few persons, though mentioning of names has been avoided. I feel that the discrepancies on these vital points between the statements made by witnesses before the Additional District Magistrate and this Committee do not warrant the veiled condemnation by the Committee of a few who are thus put into a position worse than if they had been actually accused of these offences. I shall refer to this shooting incident again in its proper place.

Regarding the constitutional reforms, I think Government never invited our suggestions on this matter. A special Committee had been appointed a few years ago in our State and witnesses representing different interests were examined before that Committee. As a result of this, the last instalment of reforms was granted. The reforms proposed in the Committee's report are at best the opinions of a few members thereof and a few witnesses. I shall refer to this subject again when dealing with the "Deeper Causes" in Chapter XII.

D.O. from the Dewan's Private Secretary.

References have been made to this matter in para II and in one or two places. The impression that is formed after reading para 62 is that the Director of Public Instruction did not disclose the receipt of this letter from the Dewan's Private Secretary with a view to avoid dragging in the name of the Dewan. I hold no brief either for the Dewan or for the Government when I say that no blame could be attached to the head of the Administration for the procedure adopted by him in this respect. Mr. Abbas Khan has stated that he made representations to the Dewan about the proposed construction of a temple in front of his house and in close proximity to a mosque. I only believe that the Dewan took the matter as one of routine and passed it on to the Director of Public Instruction in the ordinary course of business, for an enquiry. If for the time being, instead of a Mussalman Dewan there had been a Dewan of any other community, I question what he would have done when a complaint of this nature reached him. I feel sure that he would have followed the very same course as was adopted by the present Dewan. The coincidence of a Mussalman being the Dewan and the matter relating to a mosque should not be made much of to show him or the community in bad colours.

The Director of Public Instruction after inspection of the locality knew the serious consequences arising from the construction of a temple in a compound of a public school, and, as stated in para II, was not in favour of the restoration of the idol till a final enquiry was held. In his evidence before the Committee he stuck to his opinion that if the matter had been left to him he would not have ordered the restoration of the Ganesha. The Director of Public Instruction was thus alone responsible for the non-restoration of the image. If I remember correctly, the D.P.I. did explain at the first Peace Conference the difficulties he felt in not ordering the restoration of the idol. Obviously, there was no need at that time to state in the conference as to who complained against the construction of the temple or under whose instructions he was enquiring into the matter.

The Government, though they had before them the D.P.I.'s definite views regarding the restoration of the Ganapathi, yet ordered its restoration as an act of grace to satisfy the Hindu public—an act which was misunderstood

both by the students and their leaders. I, therefore, think that much importance should not be attached to this letter, and agree in finding "the D.P.I. was equally right in using his discretion and detaining the image till he had taken time to consider the whole question fully." (*Vide* para 61.)

Preparation by the Mussalmans.

A perusal of Chapter VI creates an impression that the Mussalmans being annoyed at the construction of the niche and the performance of 'bhajanas' in front of the school, planned to attack the Hindus when they came to offer 'mangalarathy' on the 30th July. I shall refer to a few sentences appearing in the Report which go to create this impression :—

Para 59. The Mussalmans "naturally apprehended trouble and offence to their religious feelings in consequence of the construction of a niche in the Muslim neighbourhood and close to a mosque."

Para 60. "The boys also sang 'bhajanas' or hymns which seem to have caused annoyance to Mussalmans visiting the mosque."

Para 61. It is stated in this para that "it is clear to us that at the time the niche itself was interpreted as a temple."

In para 67, a sentence runs thus:—"whether they were previously allowed to collect there or whether they got into Mr. Abbas Khan's house through the mosque premises by climbing over a wall which divides the mosque from the house is not made quite clear."

In para 70 (1). "The majority of members entertained no doubt that there was shooting from the cycle shop as well as from opposite the school. The shots in the latter case might have come from the house of Mr. Abbas Khan or the compound of his house or they may be from the road outside the compound wall."

I may be permitted here to say that there is not sufficient evidence before us to draw such conclusions. My own feeling about the whole incident on the 30th night is that it was an unpremeditated riot on the part of the parties, the provoking causes being Mr. Belur Sreenivasa Iyengar's speech and the pelting of stones by the Hindu crowd on the adjoining Muslim houses and the mosque.

The Mussalmans did know the difference between a niche and a temple. From the evidence given by Muslim

witnesses it is clear that no Mussalman in the neighbourhood took it as an offence or an annoyance when 'bhajanas' were performed or the niche constructed. What the Mussalmans seem to have objected to was the proposed expansion of the niche by putting up wings, expanded metal doors, and slabs for breaking cocoanuts, etc., which would convert the niche into a temple. The niche as it exists is not visible from either the mosque or the minaret, as the former is hidden by Mr. Abbas Khan's house and no one climbs the latter. To say that the niche itself was interpreted as a temple and offended Muslim feeling is contrary to facts and the evidence given by Muslim witnesses.

Further, it is stated in para 67 that Mr. Abbas Khan allowed Mussalmans to collect in his house or they came by climbing over the wall separating his house from the mosque. According to the plan appended to the Report, it will be seen that this wall is 14 feet high. It is presumed by the Committee that a congregation engaged in worship scaled a wall 14 feet high, jumped into the backyard of Mr. Abbas Khan's house and invaded the privacy of a Mussalman 'Zanana,' when they could have more easily come to the spot by the side lane. The idea seems to me to be preposterous and one that looks ridiculous in the eyes of Mussalmans. There is evidence that they came only from the side lane.

It is also assumed in the Report that the Mussalmans, knowing that the 'mangalarathy' would take place and the procession marching through Dodpet would go to the school, had ample time to prepare themselves for the attack. (*Vide* para 72). As I have stated above, I cannot subscribe to this view. Hardly a few Hindus knew that there would be 'mangalarathy' that day at the school. Those who were instrumental in obtaining the release of the arrested leaders, themselves did not know that the released leaders would go to the school for 'mangalarathy.' In fact, one of the leaders went the wrong way from the school and the other two took a round-about route to go to that spot. The Hindu crowd went to the school in the wake of the procession; otherwise there would have been no Hindu crowd even at the school. If a procession passes the Yelahanka Gate and moves through the bazaar or goes to the Hospital, it does not follow that it would also go to the school. The crowds were really expected to collect either at the Dharmambudi Tank or at the

Gandhi Maidan as notified by the organisers. In the face of the meeting place being notified as the Gandhi Maidan, it would be too much to presume that the procession leaving the Hospital would go to the school and not to the Gandhi Maidan. So, the Mussalmans had hardly any time for the alleged preparation. Even the Police at the Yelahanka Gate did not know that the procession would go to the school. The Assistant Superintendent of Police, who saw the procession near the Market Square, did not know that it would go there. I cannot, therefore, believe that "it was well known that there would be 'mangalarathy' at the school." In the face of open declarations by influential Hindu gentlemen before responsible Government officers that the leaders would not go to the school, and a promise to that effect also, it is not possible for a non-Hindu community, not participating in any religious ceremonies, to know for certain that there would be a 'mangalarathy' at the school and that that occasion should be availed of for attacking the Hindus. The Police who noticed the procession at the Yelahanka gate took no precaution at the school, and yet the Mussalmans are presumed to have known the final destination of the Hindu crowd which did not pass through any Muslim locality.

The Mussalmans are reported to have been "nursing their resentment" (*Vide* para 82). I wonder what they did to show this. They bore with patience all that was taking place from the 24th to the evening of the 30th. They did not approach the higher authorities to ventilate their grievances, or wait in deputation on the Dewan or the Members of Council. They did not even "resort to physical violence." On the other hand, the Mussalmans were agreeable to observe "Hartal" along with their Hindu brethren till the Ganapathi was restored. The perfect peace at the school on the 29th and the whole of the 30th was clearly due to their indifference in the matter of the Ganesha or its restoration, which had been effected. If there had been "resentment," they would have certainly resorted to physical force on the 29th when the number of Hindus at the school was very insignificant. In sub-para 3 of para 46 some Hindu witnesses have been quoted as having seen persons gathered in the compound of Mr. Abbas Khan's house or in front of it. If the statements of these witnesses are read as a whole, could they be believed at all? Do they not hopelessly contradict one another?

Except Mr. Venkatasubbaiah, no one speaks of "red-coated Mussalmans" emerging from Mr. Abbas Khan's house, to attack the Hindus. Except contractor Mr. Sanjeeviah, no one has seen "4 or 5 Moplas walking up and down in his compound." Mr. Vajapeyam Venkatesiah has been contradicted on at least half a dozen points of evidence by other witnesses. Apart from the avowed hostility of Mr. Subbarama Setty towards Mr. Abbas Khan, many points in his evidence have been contradicted by other witnesses. I am on the whole, therefore, inclined to think that there was no preparation whatever on the part of the Mussalmans to attack the Hindus on the 30th night. Preparation on the part of the Mussalmans cannot be assumed even on the evidence of Mr. Setlur who speaks of a meeting in Kumbarpet on the 29th July. He himself says that his information is hearsay. The excitement amongst the Mussalmans of the Civil and Military Station on the 29th was due to the rumoured desecration of the Saint's tomb in the City Market Square. This was a Municipal subject of some standing, causing some anxiety to the Mussalmans of the City and Cantonment. It is stated in para 72 that "during the day a rumour had got abroad both in the City and Cantonment that the Dewan had been injured and that there was a likelihood of Mr. Abbas Khan and the mosque behind his house being attacked." This statement is only partly correct. It is true that there was a rumour that the Dewan had been injured, that some Mussalmans called at his residence to make enquiries and that those who did so dispersed quietly. But there was no rumour *during the day* either in the City or in Cantonment that *the mosque or Mr. Abbas Khan's house* would be attacked. This rumour got current only in the night *after the riot* when stones had been pelted on the mosque, and the house had been actually attacked. I may also mention here that much has been made in the Report of the appearance of the Cantonment Mussalmans in the City after the riot, and their arrival has been connected with events preceding the riot. These Mussalmans arrived only after 10 or 11 P.M. On their way to Sultanpet they did not commit any acts of mischief. After their arrival at the school, they were under the escort of the Military and were marched out of the City limits. There was a false alarm that some of them were in Arlepet. The Assistant Superintendent of Police who patrolled the area has stated that there were

none in that area. Some Cantonment Mussalmans who appeared near the Oosmania Theatre at midnight were easily dispersed. There is no evidence that any of these entered the danger zone. If these Muslim bands meant any mischief against the Hindus, would they not have attacked the latter in the unprotected parts of the City, such as, Nagarthpet, Cubbonpet, etc.? Not a single act of violence has been recorded against these batches. On the other hand, it was the Hindu batches who wreaked their vengeance on stray Mussalmans in Arlepet and Gundopanth Street. In the face of these facts, I do not think it is correct to say " they invaded the City and struck terror among the City population while marching through the streets." (*Vide* para 108). This is in fact accepting without proper test the Hindu version, *viz.*, " These bands of C. & M. Mussalmans marching in the streets of the City struck terror into the hearts of its inhabitants ". (*Vide* para 36.)

The shooting incident.

I agree with Mr. Nagappa who considers that the Committee is not called upon to express an opinion on this point which is one for the Investigating Magistrate. I have dissented from the finding of the Committee relating to the shooting incident, adhering to my answer to question 4 in the questionnaire set by the Chairman.

In paras 70 and 116, it is stated that there was shooting from both the cycle shop and opposite the school. But in para 70 (2) it is stated that " the majority of the members entertain no doubt that there was shooting from the cycle shop as well as from opposite the school. The shots in the latter case might have come from the house of Mr. Abbas Khan or the compound of his house or they may be from the road outside the compound wall." I think, when we cannot say for certain whence the shots came, it is not fair to mention Mr. Abbas Khan's or anybody else's name.

Considering the evidence produced, I do not believe that there was any shooting from the cycle shop or from Mr. Abbas Khan's house, or that the boy Chandraraj was hit from either of these places. Unless the course of the bullet in the body is known, it is unsafe, I think, to locate the direction from which the shots came. Medical evidence on this important point is lacking. It cannot be definitely stated from the contradictory statements made by Chandraraj and the non-extraction of the alleged bullet

from his body, due to the refusal of the boy's father of permission for an operation, that Chandraraj was hit by shots. It is mentioned in the Report that "we are aware that some respectable witnesses have stated that they did not notice any shots from opposite the school. This can be accounted for by the noise and confusion which prevailed after the first shots from the cycle shop were fired and by the anxiety of every one to fly for his life." In this connection, I believe the rule is that the evidence of respectable persons is entitled to the fullest weight. The "noise and confusion" and "the anxiety to fly" are common factors affecting all grades of witnesses present on the spot. If a single shot had been fired, it is just possible that the direction from which it came could not have been easily located. But, when a number of shots are alleged to have been fired at regular intervals from Mr. Abbas Khan's house, it is unbelievable that all or any of them could not have been heard by such witnesses as Messrs. T. T. Sharma, Sarvabhatta, S. R. Ramaswami Iyer (Sub-Judge), Rangaswami Iyengar, Subbarama Setty and several others. These witnesses speak generally in favour of Hindus. Hence, if they say that there was no firing I think they have got to be believed. It should be well remembered that as the enquiry prolonged an opportunity was afforded for the development of the theory of shooting from Mr. Abbas Khan's house, and some witnesses who came later were enabled to depose positively in this matter.

Composition of Military and Police.

It has been remarked in sub-para 23 of para 97, sub-para 2 of para 107 and in para 105, that the existing "representation of the Hindu and Muslim Community makes the forces not dependable in emergencies when communal quarrels are involved." Here, I must say that, considering the loyal services rendered by these forces, these remarks appear to me to be thoroughly unjustifiable. During the worst days of the non-co-operation and the Khilafat movements, both the Hindu and Muslim officers, as well as men, did not flinch from what they considered to be their duty. The Mussalmans fought in the Mysore Lancers against their co-religionists—the Turks—in the Great War, in spite of the 'Fatwas' of the 'Ulemas' declaring that they would become 'Kafirs' if they did so. There is not a single incident to show that a Mussalman sowar caused an injury to a Hindu on the 30th

July, or that a Hindu sowar caused an injury to a Mussalman. Religious sentiment did not cloud their loyalty. Without the evidence of a single incident of their partiality, I do not consider that the Committee is justified in making a remark that they are not dependable when communal quarrels are involved. If the majority of the force are not to be composed of Hindus and Mussalmans, I do not see what other communities can be represented in it. There is no evidence to hold that "the fact that there were many Mussalmans in the police force might also be a reason for the officers of the force not taking prompt action." The statement appears to be a mere surmise. This reason has not been advanced by responsible officers like the Inspector-General of Police, the District Magistrate, The District Superintendent of Police or the Assistant Superintendent of Police.

Appointment of Mr. C. Machia as Additional District Magistrate.

In Chapter VI, para 76, a reference has been made to Mr. C. Machia's appointment as Additional District Magistrate, superseding Mr. Thammaji Rao's appointment. It has been stated that "the appointment of a junior officer at first and then of another who, though a senior officer, was at the time associated with Mr. Abbas Khan in the Municipal Administration of the Bangalore City, was not considered particularly happy and calculated to ease the tension in the public mind." Without knowing the reasons of Government for these changes, I do not think that the Committee was justified in commenting upon this appointment. The sentences, as they occur in a chapter headed "Principal Incidents Examined," might give an impression that the Committee considered the appointment as improper. Mr. C. Machia has a glorious record for strict impartiality during his long service extending over 30 years. He has been a District Superintendent of Police of proved merit. It would be unfair to an officer of Mr. Machia's status and stamp if we allowed the public to think that he, as Municipal Commissioner, would be partial to the then President of the Municipal Council.

Government and its Officers.

I do not hold any brief for the Government, but I do not find myself in agreement with the extremist view that "it was the break down of the Government machinery on the occasion that has created real apprehension and provoked just criticism." (*Vide* para 123). In

regard to this, I beg to say that communal riots are not unknown in any State or in British India. Arrests are a matter in the discretion of the executive officers on the spot. If the latter commit mistakes, they are liable to be punished. If the searches were not made promptly, that is again the mistake of the executive officers in charge of the affair. The situation was grave on the 29th July, and in spite of the Director of Public Instruction's opinion to the contrary the Government restored the idol. The situation was very grave again on the 31st July and for two or three days subsequently. It is on record that very good Military arrangements were ordered by the Government and perfect tranquility was soon restored in spite of misrepresentation by the Press—local and foreign. I would, therefore, suggest the alteration of the wording in the Committee's Report from "the break down of the Government machinery" to "inactivity of the local officers."

In para 98 it has been stated that "at the same time it must be remarked that they were almost in hourly touch with the members of the Government." This might mean that the Government was guiding the situation. No member of Government was present at the Sultanpet school at the time of the riot. The District Magistrate had more than the Military needed to control the situation and take action about the arrests near the school in the night. It was the duty of the executive officers to have controlled the situation, taken steps to arrest, etc. In the same paragraph it has been stated that "neither at that time nor on the following morning did Government find fault with these officers for not acting, nor was there any explanation for their inactivity called for on any subsequent date." I think that "fault finding" at that time or on the following morning "could hardly have been proper as the disturbances had not quite ceased." Fault finding has to come after a thorough enquiry. This would have taken days and it was impossible "at that time or on the following morning." It must be remembered that the appointment of this Committee was for the sole purpose of getting an impartial opinion on the conduct of the officers concerned. The Government would have been in a most awkward position if it had found fault with any officers whom the Committee, after an exhaustive enquiry, found blameless, or had exonerated those whom the Committee found to be at fault

subsequently. In the face of the facts elicited by us during our enquiry and our opinions thereon, it is now for the Government to obtain explanations of the officers and punish them. Fault finding previous to our Report would have been premature.

In para 120 it has been stated, "whether it was that they were afraid to move in the case of such an influential public man or *what other motives there were*, has not been made clear," I do not think that the Committee is justified in imputing any motives to the high officers who tried in their own way to control the situation. There has been an emphatic assertion on the part of the Inspector-General of Police, the District Magistrate, the District Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police that they were not at all swayed by any consideration that Mr. Abbas Khan was an influential person, and that they had no instructions from any one to spare him.

The Miller Committee Report.

It has been suggested in the Report (*vide* para 108) that to bring about amity and goodwill between the different classes in the State, the recommendations made by the Miller Committee and the orders of the Government thereon should be revised to suit present conditions. I have to say that I was a member of this Committee and have also been a member of the *Praja Mitra Mandali* from its inception. I, personally, know the various details that were considered by the Miller Committee before the Report was submitted to the Government. The percentage of representation of Non-Brahmins in State service, prescribed by the Government order, has not been reached, in spite of the fact that a large number of qualified Non-Brahmins are now available for employment. The present Government modified the original order slightly, as a result of which it became immediately unpopular with the entire Non-Brahmin population of the State, and the matter was the source of repeated representations and interpellations in the Legislative Council and the Representative Assembly. In the face of the Government Order on the Miller Committee Report, more than 90 per cent of the appointments carrying a salary of Rs. 100 and above are still held by Brahmins, and the minimum of 50 percent of the appointments in each office of the grade between Rs. 15 and Rs. 100, fixed for Non-Brahmins by that order, has not been reached. If the Government Order on the Miller Committee Report

had been conscientiously worked with the sympathy of the Brahmin officers, the prescribed percentage might have beed reached by now, and the Government been in a position to review the situation. The Non-Brahmins get very little encouragement during their training, once they get into service, and it is a fact that all possible attempts are made to scare away those who intend or try to enter service. As things now stand, the monopoly of one class in the Government service, which carries power and influence with it, tends to the denial to over 98 per cent of the Non-Brahmin population of opportunities to actively and efficiently take part in the Administration of the State. There is no dearth among Non-Brahmins of persons possessing the necessary qualifications for appointments, and there is also merit and industry in them, provided the judges are fair. So far, the fate of Non-Brahmins being mostly in the hands of the Brahmins, it is complained that there has been very little recognition of their qualifications. It is, therefore, necessary that the order on the Miller Committee Report should be stiffened instead of being weakened, and that any change should aim at the increased representation of the Non-Brahmins in all the grades of service. It is also my opinion that the proposed Round-table Conference would bring about no good but more bitter feelings between the Non-Brahmins and the Brahmins.

In this connection the Committee have stated as follows:—"There were perhaps individual agitators who wrote anonymous communications and spread false or exaggerated rumours secretly and whose misdeeds would come within the purview of the law courts if sufficient evidence were forthcoming. But the acts of such individuals have had no sufficient support from any large part of the population. We have so far not seen any documentary or other clear evidence except some articles in a few newspapers of an attempt to overthrow the Government." I must remark here that this is in the nature of things in all political conspiracies all over the world. In conspiracies of this kind engineered by a few agitators, it is not always possible to secure any documentary evidence. Its absence should not be interpreted as meaning that there is no such clique. Government should, however, watch the movements and doings of these agitators who if left uncontrolled, would

Conspiracy, para 114, sub-para 2.

always try to bring about disharmony among the subjects of the State and attempt to thwart, if not overthrow, the Government. Just as the Committee have recommended that investigations should be pursued by Government in orther matters (*vide* para 101), I think it is necessary that this more important matter should also receive constant attention on the part of Government.

Satyagraha.

In para 125 of the Report reference is made to the *Satyagraha* in Bardoli, and the one in Bangalore is said to be but a reflex of it. But, were the leaders and supporters of the students in Bangalore influenced by the same principles that guided the movement in Bardoli? We are painfully aware of the acts of violence on the part of the students during the so-called *Satyagraha*. The so-called leaders were mere agitators who, by misinterpreting the high principles enunciated by that great philosopher of the day—Mahatma Gandhi—to the boys of tender age, tried to come to the fore-front of politics in the garb of patriots. What havoc such unscrupulous leaders, who have no other but their personal advancement in view, create, needs no comment by me. The Committee has dealt with these *Satyagrahis* lightly when it should have condemned in strong terms the movement that was accompanied with violence, illegal acts, and inflammatory speeches. Even the Government officers did not take a serious view of the position nor early action to stem it. It, therefore, behoves Government to watch the activities of such agitators and put them down with a strong hand.

Constitutional reforms.

I have already stated that this question does not arise under the terms of reference. Mr. Ralph Nye has not agreed to all the recommendations made in Chapter XII. I would not, as a democrat, object to a constitutional monarchy and a responsible Government as ideals to be attained.

Reference has been made in the Report about the constitutions of Government in England, Japan, Italy, Turkey and Afghanistan, as a basis for our future constitution of the State. It needs no saying that the conditions prevailing in these, or in any other such countries, are not analogous to those in Mysore. The question, therefore, centres round the fact whether the present educational, social, moral and economic conditions of the people justify the grant of more liberal reforms. There is no gainsaying the fact that our benign Maharaja, anticipating the keen

desire of his subjects to participate closely in the administration of the State, has granted them rights and privileges, and has even gone ahead of other Native States and, in some cases, of British India. The views of the accredited leaders of the people are taken in all important matters affecting the administration of the State, and the Ruler in Mysore has been carrying on the Government with the full support and confidence of his subjects. In Mysore the interests of the people at large and those of the Ruler are identical. The sense of justice and fair-play always exhibited by our Maharaja have won for him the greatest respect, love and confidence of his subjects. What the State needs most is the right type of unselfish and patriotic representatives of the people to co-operate with the Government and the Maharaja in a most sincere and honest manner and attain the ideal above-named. The State subjects should, in my opinion, first "deserve" and then "desire", constitutional reforms. This is not possible unless our actions, in the ideals of the greatest living democrat—Mahatma Gandhi —are unselfish, truthful and honest.

Past history has clearly shown to us that everywhere responsible Government has been finally achieved by the grants of constitutional reforms in instalments to suit the conditions of the people and the times. The present constitution in England is the outcome of efforts for centuries on the part of the people for more power, and was not achieved wholesale. People in England agitated for more reforms when they became conscious of their rights and found themselves quite fit to exercise them. Judging from the condition of people in our State, could it be said that a responsible Government of that kind can be given immediately. Want of suitable facilities for universal education, the illiteracy of the electorate who do not know even their elementary rights, and the lack of disinterested workers, are a great handicap to the grant of a further instalment of reforms in Mysore. Any grant of further constitutional reforms under these conditions would only mean giving more power to an oligarchy already in power. I think, therefore, that the time is still inopportune for the subjects of this State to demand any constitutional reforms, whatever the aspirations of the few educated and politically minded people may be.

The Simon Commission is yet to conclude its report regarding the constitutional reforms to be introduced in British

India. The Dyarchical system which has so prominently been referred to in para 128 of the Report has, to our knowledge, not been a success. It is also not known what the Simon Commission is going to say about its working. The Butler Enquiry Committee, is at the same time, considering the position of the Indian States in the general constitution of India. What proposals they would formulate for bringing the Indian States into the general constitution remains yet to be seen. While these important questions are still being discussed, I believe that any proposal to introduce constitutional reforms at this stage may land the Government in a difficult position.

The Press in Mysore.

In para 141 of the Report it is stated that "the liberties at present enjoyed by the Press and the people in Mysore are no more than are conceded in British India, and however much we may deplore the excesses committed by some of them, it will not be practicable to restrict their present freedom and liberty, or insist upon a lower standard of relations between the Government and the people than is permitted in the neighbouring British Provinces." In regard to this, I have only to say that political conditions in British India and in Mysore State are not analogous. We need not blindly imitate British India in all respects.

No one can object to an honest criticism of the actions taken or the measures adopted by Government, if it is made in the true interests of the public. But, if the Press consciously incites communal hatred and tries to lower the authority of Government by means of personal attacks in a violent and offensive tone, or by spreading false rumours about men and measures, some suitable action should be taken promptly to suppress it. I feel that Government have been dealing very leniently with some of the editors of the newspapers, whose one avowed object has been to bring into disrepute the Ruler and his Government both in the eyes of the subjects and abroad.

The low tone of the Press is in many instances due to the desire on the part of the editors to gain cheap popularity for, and augment the sales of, their papers by writing scurrilous articles against Government and others. If the Press is to be the right medium to ventilate popular grievances and propound new and right ideas, the editors should be persons who could rise above party or communal politics and be true to their convictions and principles. Great care should, therefore, be taken to find out the

capacity of people coming forward to edit papers before licenses are granted, and any violation of the press laws should be dealt with severely.

Conclusion.

I feel I should not omit to refer to two sentences in para 126 which are very painful reading and are unjust to the Muslim community. I refer to the passage, "the Mussalmans who formerly were tolerant to the customs of the preponderatingly Hindu population among whom they lived have in recent times been showing a tendency to stand apart. It is we believe a reflex of that feeling that precipitated the communal quarrel in Bangalore." This is evidently a condemnation of a community which for a whole week bore patiently the opprobrious shouting against co-religionists—the Dewan and Mr. Abbas Khan —suffered obstruction to traffic on the road, and, on one occasion, looked quietly on an indignity offered to the occupants of gosha carts. The above incidents show that Mussalmans are just as tolerant in Mysore now as they were ever before. I may also remind the Committee here about the inflammatory speeches of Mr. H. V. Subrahmanyam and other Hindu leaders which, though inciting enough, were yet tolerated by the Mussalmans. The tendency of Mussalmans to stand apart from Hindus, which to some extent exists in British India, does not exist in our State, as Mussalmans have completely identified themselves with the majority of the Hindu population. The wholesale condemnation, which is conveyed by the sentences noted above, is hardly the correct thing for a Committee to make, when it was called upon to propose measures for restoring peace and communal harmony.

BANGALORE CITY,
15th January 1929.

(Sd.) GULAM AHMED KALAMI,
Member, Bangalore Disturbances Enquiry Committee.

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APPENDIX i.

ORDER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE appointing a COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY in connection with the DISTURBANCES IN THE CITY OF BANGALORE.

No. 1042-1102—*C. B.* 38-28-114, *dated 28th August* 1928.

The disturbances which occurred in the City of Bangalore on the 30th and 31st July 1928 have given rise to various unfounded rumours and in some cases to the publication of distorted or exaggerated versions of the happenings in the public press.

Shortly after the occurrence, *viz.*, on the 3rd August 1928, and again on the 20th August 1928, Government took the opportunity to convene meetings of the leading citizens of the different communities with a view to allay public apprehension and restore good will and harmony between the communities concerned.

With the same end in view, Government have also been communicating to the press and the public from time to time the information collected by their own agencies.

2. There still appears to exist a feeling of uneasiness in the public mind and there is a widespread desire for an authoritative public enquiry to be conducted by an influential Committee composed of Government Officers and leading representatives of the non-official public.

3. Government are accordingly pleased to appoint a Committee constituted as follows :—

CHAIRMAN :

Sir M. Visvesvaraya, K.C.I.E.

MEMBERS :

1. Mr. Justice D. K. Rama Rao, B.A., B.L., *Judge, Chief Court of Mysore.*
2. Mr. H. G. Basavappa, *Member, Legislative Council.*
3. Mr. Gulam Ahmed Kalami.
4. Mr. V. Manickavelu Mudaliar.
5. Mr. B. Nagappa, Bar-at-Law, *Legal Remembrancer and Secretary to Government, Law Department.*
6. Mr. Ralph Nye, *Member, Legislative Council.*

4. The Terms of Reference to the Committee are :—

1. To ascertain the root causes and course of events that led to the disturbances ;

2. To investigate the special causes or influences, if any, which were at work at the time and which led to such unusual events ;

3. To examine the steps taken by the local officers to cope with the situation ; and

4. To suggest any future measures necessary to remove misunderstandings and restore good feeling and harmony among the various communities concerned.

5. The information obtained in the course of the magisterial investigation now in progress will be placed at the disposal of the Committee, which will commence its enquiry as soon as possible.

6. Government trust the Committee will receive all the help and co-operation needed in their labours both from the officers of Government and the general public.

APPENDIX ii.

Chronological Narrative of Events.

2nd & 5th June 1928.	Construction of a niche without permission in the Sultanpet Kannada Middle School.
15th June 1928.	The Director of Public Instruction ordered that the Ganesha image should be kept in a room until final orders were passed.
21st June 1928.	Mr. Mahomed Abbas Khan questioned the Overseer about the construction of the niche in the presence of the Director of Public Instruction.
28th June 1928.	Mr. Abbas Khan interviewed the Editor *Veerakesari*, and explained matters.
23rd July 1928.	Boys of the school complained to the Headmaster about the non-restoration of Ganesha.
24th July 1928.	Strike commenced, led by Mr. H. V. Subrahmanyam. Mamoolpet School students forced to join. Procession of boys in streets. Police issued special instructions to watch movement of boys.
25th July 1928.	Students created disturbances in other schools. Procession headed by Mr. H. V. Subrahmanyam who made a speech in Market Square alleged to be offensive to the Muslim community.
26th July 1928.	Procession led by Messrs. H. V. Subrahmanyam and Thiwari visits schools in Malleswaram where excesses were committed. Superior Police officers contemplate preventive action.
27th July 1928.	Strike converted to *Satyagraha* (passive resistance). Traffic impeded to some extent. Boys given food by sympathisers.
28th July 1928.	*Satyagraha* continued. Two *gosha* carts were stopped which brought forth protests from Mussalmans. City Magistrate issued preliminary order and warrants of arrest under Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code.
29th July 1928.	Strike leaders were arrested. Third Member of Council visited School. Ganesha was reinstalled. *Satyagraha* continued under the direction of Mr. Sarvabhatta.

30th July 1928.	General strike of students of several schools. Demonstrations before Central Jail, Dewan's residence and Public Offices. Military called out to aid Police. Leaders released at 6-30 P.M. Leaders went in procession to Sultanpet School where a *serious riot* occurred. Riot quelled with the aid of the Military. Stray assaults on the same night in the City. Mussalmans of Cantonment, some armed with *lathis*, visited the City but were turned back.
31st July 1928.	Military patrolled the City. In the evening, British Armoured Cars were also used for patrol. Communiques Nos. I and II issued. Mr. Thammaji Rao appointed a First Class Magistrate.
3rd August 1928.	Government convened a Conference to exchange views with leading public men to restore peace and harmony.
6th August 1928.	Mr. C. Machia appointed Additional District Magistrate.
20th August 1928.	A Second Conference convened between Officers of Government and leading public men of the State.
23th August 1928.	Government Order issued appointing a Committee to enquire into the disturbances.
12th September 1928.	The Disturbances Enquiry Committee commenced to record evidence.
12th November 1928.	The Committee having completed collecting evidence concluded its sittings.

APPENDIX iii.

Statement showing the percentage of literate population among the different communities in the Mysore State according to the Census of 1921.

Area	Brahmins	Hindus other than Brahmins	Mussalmans	Other castes	Total population
1. Bangalore City.—					
i. Population	23,047	76,144	13,112	6,253	1,18,556
ii. Literate population ..	11,576 †	18,508	3,249	2,781	36,114
iii. Percentage of literacy* ..	50·2	24·3	24·8	44·5	30·5
2. Mysore State (excluding Civil and Military Station, Bangalore).—					
i. Population	2,13,112	52,02,524	3,15,387	1,28,929	58,59,952
ii. Literate population ..	98,311	2,54,822	40,953	18,610	4,12,696
iii. Percentage of literacy* ..	46·1	4·9	13·0	14·4	7·0
3. Bangalore Civil and Military Station.—					
i. Population	2,462	63,601	25,074	27,803	1,18,940
ii. Literate population ..	1,282	10,499	5,326	13,370	30,477
iii. Percentage of literacy* ..	52·1	16·5	21·2	48·1	25·6

*Proportion of (ii) literate population to (i) total population.

† No census tabulated figure being available, this figure has been arrived at on the basis of the figure given for the whole State. The percentage of Brahmin literacy for the whole State (including Civil and Military Station, Bangalore) is about 46·2; Bangalore City being the administrative capital a slightly higher percentage is assumed.

APPENDIX iv.

Statement showing proportion of Hindus, Mussalmans and other castes employed in the **Police Force** of the Mysore State.

	Mysore State excluding Bangaloro City		Bangaloro City		Total of Columns 2 and 4	Per-centage
	Strength	Percentage	Strength	Percentage		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hindus ..	4,058	67·1	215	61·1	4,273	66·8
Mussalmans	1,803	29·8	120	34·1	1,923	30·0
Other Castes.	187	3·1	17	4·8	204	3·2
Total ..	6,048	..	352	..	6,400	100·00

APPENDIX v.

Statement showing proportion of Hindus, Mussalmans and other castes employed in the **Military Force** of the Mysore State.

	Mysore Cavalry (Mysore Horse and Lancers)		Mysore Infantry		Mysore Transport Corps		Total strength	Percentage
	Total strength	Percentage	Total strength	Percentage	Total strength	Percentage		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Hindus ..	479	56·7	813	49·9	47	37·9	1,339	51·6
Mussalmans.	345	40·9	624	38·3	74	59·6	1,043	40·1
Other Castes.	20	2·4	193	11·8	3	2·5	216	8·3
Total ..	844	..	1,630	..	124	...	2,598	100·00

APPENDIX vi.

Attendance, from 24th to 30th July 1928, in Schools and Colleges of the City of Bangalore, as affected by the Students' Strike and *Satyagraha*.

Serial No.	Name of institution	Total strength	Percentage of Non-Hindus	24-7-1928	25-7-1928	26-7-1928	27-7-1928	28-7-1928	29-7-1928	30-7-1928
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1	Sultanpet Middle School.	344	·87	49	97	58	41	8		..
2	Mamoolpet Middle School.	362	1·7	124	162	118	55	43		..
3	Aryavidyasala Middle School.	386	....	338	369	....	113	27		59
4	Aryavidyasala Aided Primary School.	139	·7	127	62	....	53	19		50
5	Central College ..	467	3·64	Attendance was normal.						..
6	Engineering College.	254	3·93			Do				..
7	Intermediate College.	978	5·0			Do				..
8	Wesleyan Mission High School.	548	13·6			Do			Sunday.	134
9	London Mission High School.	404	7·2			Do				26
10	Government High School, Fort.	698	4·86			Do				69
11	Government High School, Malleswaram.	393	7·1			Do				..
12	National High School	303	2·0			Do				..
	Total ..	5,266	....							338

APPENDIX vii.

Note on the number of persons injured and the nature of injuries sustained during the Disturbances of 30th July 1928.

[*Note.*—Only cases admitted to or treated in Hospitals are taken into account.]

Of the 134 civilians injured at the several places on 30th July 1928 and *admitted into Hospitals*, 58 received more or less serious injuries. Of these, there were 4 cases of really serious injuries comprising one bullet wound and three fractures of bones. The remaining 54 injuries were less serious. They consisted of 13 cases of lacerated wounds on the head, one case of tearing of the left pinna of the ear, one case of incised wound on the left side of the chest below the nipple, two penetrating wounds of the scapula, one case of injury to the foot, and 32 cases of contusions on the head. In the remaining cases the injuries were on other parts of the body. In two cases the legs were amputated.

The above mentioned civilians received injuries at the centres of conflict shown in the following table :—

		Hindus	Mussalmans	Total
1.	Carlton House	1	..	1
2.	Public Offices	5	..	5
3.	Central Jail	4	..	4
4.	Sultanpet School	74	2	76
5.	Unascertained places	39	9	48
	Total ..	123	11	134

Amongst the 50 Military who were injured, three were grievously hurt, and seven got contusions. The remaining cases were simple injuries. The Military suffered injuries at Carlton House, Public Offices and Kantaraj Urs Circle.

The six Police injured bore contusions.

The injuries of the nine Jail Staff who were wounded near the Jail were all contusions.

APPENDIX viii.

Particulars of Stray Communal Assaults in Bangalore City.

(31st July to 1st September 1928.)

AND

Incidents affecting places of Religious Worship in the Mysore State.

(31st July to 21st September 1928.)

The number of incidents is given in the following table.—

——	Bangalore City	Bangalore District	Other Districts	Remarks
1. Assaults on persons.	23	..	..	20 assaults are ascribed to unknown Mussalmans and 3 to unknown Hindus. Three cases of robbery out of 5 and 1 case of dacoity out of 2 appear to be probable and these are under investigation. Patrols were arranged for in other cases.
2. Damage to places of religious worship.	..	5	12	In 5 cases idols were damaged and in 2 cases Idgas (Muslim places of worship). Out of 5 cases of theft, temple servants are involved in 2. There were two cases of Temples actually defiled.

MAP OF BANGALORE CITY

SHOWING PLACES CONNECTED WITH DISTURBANCES OF 30th JULY 1928.

Scale 3·168 Inches to 1 Mile.



REFERENCE

IMPORTANT SCENES

1. Central Jail.
2. Carlton House.
3. Public Offices.
4. Yalahanka Gate Police Station.
5. Dharmambudi Tank.
6. Market Square.
7. Victoria Hospital.
8. Sultanpet A. V. School.

OTHER PLACES REFERRED TO IN REPORT.

9. Mysore Lancers' Lines.
10. Kantaraj Urs Circle.
11. Sri Krishnarajendra Circle.
12. Central College
13. [illegible]
14. London Mission High School.
15. Wesleyan Mission High School.
16. Municipal Garden.
17. City New Market.
18. Market Police Station.
19. Fort High School.
20. Assistant Superintendent's Office (Police), Fort.
21. Gandhi Maidan
22. Chamarajapet A. V. School.
23. Mamoolpet A. V. School.
24. Arya Viddya Patasala.
25. Malleswaram High School
26. Malleswaram Middle School.
27. Malleswaram Primary School.

Boundary, C. & M. Station.

Tanks.

Railway line

10th December 1928.

DISTURBANCES IN BANGALORE CITY

30th JULY 1928

Sultanpet School Area

Scale 60 ft. = 1 Inch.

REFERENCE		
(1)		Mr. Abbas Khan's House.
(2)	a	Niche in Front of Middle School Gate in which Ganesha is Placed.
(3)		Back Door Leading to Urdu School.
(4)		Room in which footsteps, etc., are to be seen on the wall.
(5)		Heap of Brickbats
(6)		Upstair House with Barber & Cycle Shops on Ground Floor.
(7)		Girls' School.
(8)		Guava Tree in Mr. Abbas Khan's House.
(9)	ab-ah	Height of walls Touching the MIMBER in the Masjid 16ft.
(10)	am-bk	Walls North & South 14ft. High.
(11)	c	Height of Girls' School Building 14 ft. 6 in. South Side of Mr. Abbas Khan's House.
(12)	d	Height of Upstair Building 24 ft. 6 in.
(13)		Nalbandwadi Chowk.
(14)		Ghee Shop.
(15)		Muslim Hall.
(16)		Shrinivas & Co.

10th December 1928.

Lithg. Govt. Press Bangalore.